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MEAT PROCESSING WORKERS AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: 
THE SUBROGATION OF PEOPLE, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND ETHICS 
TO PROFITS AND A PATH FORWARD 
KELLY K. DINEEN* 
ABSTRACT 
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted and exacerbated existing health 
injustices. People who are Latino/Latinx, Black, Indigenous or members of other 
minority groups have disproportionately paid with their very lives. The 
pandemic has also exposed the complex interdependence of worker health and 
well-being, community health, and economic security. Industries like meat 
processing facilities—with congregate and high-density workplaces staffed by 
workers who are already disadvantaged by structural discrimination—must 
reckon with decades of subrogation and exploitation of workers. During this 
pandemic, the industry has pushed that exploitation to a point of no return. 
Policies to protect workers need a reset to an orientation of solidarity, mutual 
respect, justice, and equity. It is time for the industry that has so often profited 
at the expense of worker safety to sacrifice their fair share. The ethical 
underpinnings here are applicable to other workers’ who have been relegated 
to the sidelines in other essential industries, such as agriculture, retail and 
public service, and long-term care. Making ethical decisions about workplace 
protections should account for those heightened risks and existing 




* Associate Professor of Law, Director, Health Law Program, Creighton University School of Law. 
Professor of Medical Humanities, Creighton University School of Medicine. 
  I would like to thank the members of the ethics committee of the Global Center for Health 
Security at the University of Nebraska, and especially Abbey Lowe, for their thoughtful 
deliberations on these issues and intellectual collaborations on ethical issues in the treatment of 
essential workers during a pandemic. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Work is a complex component of health equity;1 a failure of legal and policy 
protections in the United States has left some workers with little choice but to 
risk their health to pay for food and shelter. In April 2020, workers in beef, pork, 
and poultry processing plants (collectively “meat processing plants”) across the 
South and Midwest fell ill from workplace spread of SARS-CoV-19, the virus 
that causes COVID-19.2 Several large plants were shut down by local health 
departments in an effort to slow disease transmission, causing production delays 
and economic loss to segments of the industry.3 On April 28, 2020, after 
considerable pressure from the meat processing industry,4 then-President Trump 
signed an executive order that declared meat a critical and strategic material 
under the Defense Production Act (DPA).5 Although limited in its scope, the 
order was widely interpreted as requiring meat processing facilities to reopen 
 
 1. See, e.g., Emily Quinn Ahonen et al., Work as an Inclusive Part of Population Health 
Inequities Research and Prevention, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 306, 306–07 (2018) (describing the 
need to more explicitly consider work and workplace conditions when evaluating population 
health). 
 2. Jonathan W. Dyal et al., COVID-19 Among Workers in Meat and Poultry Processing 
Facilities ― 19 States, April 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 557, 557 (2020). 
See Naming the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the Virus That Causes It, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/ 
naming-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it (last visited Oct. 4, 
2020). 
 3. See, e.g., Michael Grabell et al., E-mails Reveal Chaos as Meatpacking Companies Fought 
Health Agencies Over COVID-19 Outbreaks in Their Plants, PROPUBLICA (June 12, 2020, 2:04 
PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/emails-reveal-chaos-as-meatpacking-companies-fought-
health-agencies-over-covid-19-outbreaks-in-their-plants (describing the regulatory gaps in 
oversight, conflicts with local health departments, and industry failures to plan for such a pandemic 
or implement recommended infection prevention and control strategies within the plants); Sarah 
Freishtat, Concerns Were Raised Multiple Times About COVID-19 and Smithfield Foods’ St. 
Charles Plant Before the Health Department Shut It Down, Records Show, AURORA BEACON 
NEWS (July 16, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/aurora-beacon-news/ct-abn-smith 
field-foods-covid-19-complaints-st-20200716-juh2l5rmgfeqdjuxgqdozqtczi-story.html. 
 4. Sky Chadde et al., A Week Before Trump’s Order Protecting Meat Plants, the Industry 
Sent Draft Language to Feds, MIDWEST CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Sept. 14, 2020), 
https://investigatemidwest.org/2020/09/14/a-week-before-trumps-order-protecting-meat-plants-in 
dustry-sent-draft-language-to-feds/ (describing how trade industry groups for the meatpacking 
industry sent executive order drafts to the White House and urged the USDA to pressure local 
health departments to reopen plants and resist further shutdowns). 
 5. Exec. Order No. 13917, 85 Fed. Reg. 26313, 26313–14 (May 1, 2020) (The order declared 
meat a critical and strategic material under the Defense Production Act and delegated authority to 
the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture to ensure “proper nationwide priorities and 
allocation of all the materials, services, and facilities necessary to ensure the continued supply of 
meat and poultry, consistent with the guidance for the operations of meat and poultry processing 
facilities jointly issued by the CDC and OSHA.”). 
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and remain operational during the pandemic, even during outbreaks.6 By the 
time the executive order was announced, thousands of meat processing workers 
had fallen ill, and some had died.7  
After more than six months of continued operations, a lack of mandatory 
reporting, and concerted efforts to hide data,8 the Midwest Center for 
Investigative Reporting estimated that 41,000 of just under 500,000 meat 
processing workers contracted COVID-19 and nearly 200 died from the 
infection.9 During the same time period, just under 20,000 of almost 1.4 million 
 
 6. See, e.g., Andrew Restuccia & Jacob Bunge, Trump Takes Executive Action to Keep Meat-
Processing Plants Open, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2020, 10:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles 
/trump-to-take-executive-action-to-keep-meat-processing-plants-open-11588099443; Katherine 
Faulders, Trump Signs Executive Order to Keep Meat Processing Plants Open Under the Defense 
Production Act, ABC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2020, 7:43 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-
sign-executive-order-meat-processing-plants-open/story?id=70389089. But see Exec. Order No. 
13917, 85 Fed. Reg. 26313, 26313–14 (May 1, 2020); Daniel Hemel, No, Trump Didn’t Order 
Meat-Processing Plants to Reopen, WASH. POST (May 4, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/outlook/2020/05/04/trump-meat-processing-order/ (describing the legal parameters of the 
executive order while acknowledging that the public and key stakeholders may perceive the order 
as requiring the plants to remain open); Dennis Aftergut, Insight: Meat Plant Executive Order Is 
Not What It Seems, BLOOMBERG L. (May 11, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com 
/corporate-governance/insight-meat-plant-executive-order-is-not-what-it-seems (“Neither the 
Constitution nor any statute gives the president authority to compel owners to operate plants they 
had closed because Covid-19 was spreading death on their assembly lines.”). 
 7. See Dyal et al., supra note 2, at 558; see also Sky Chadde et al., Cheap Chicken, Beef 
Came at a Cost: How American Meat Plants Bred Coronavirus Hot Spots, USA TODAY (May 22, 
2020, 8:42 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2020/05/21/coronavi 
rus-american-chicken-beef-industry-vulnerable-despite-trump/3107636001/. 
 8. See, e.g., Peter Whoriskey, Infection Rates Were Climbing at Nebraska Meatpacking 
Plants. Then Health Officials Stopped Reporting the Numbers, WASH. POST (May 12, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/12/nebraska-coronavirus-case-numbers-
meatpacking/ (describing the Nebraska governor’s decision to stop publicly reporting numbers of 
cases tied to meat processing plants); Lewis Kendall, Revealed: Covid-19 Outbreaks at Meat-
Processing Plants in US Being Kept Quiet, THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2020, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jul/01/revealed-covid-19-outbreaks-meat-
processing-plants-north-carolina (describing the withholding of data on COVID-19 outbreaks tied 
to meat processing plants in North Carolina); Michael Corkery et al., As Meatpacking Plants 
Reopen, Data About Worker Illness Remains Elusive, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2020), https://www.ny 
times.com/2020/05/25/business/coronavirus-meatpacking-plants-cases.html. 
 9. Sky Chadde, Tracking Covid-19’s Impact on Meatpacking Workers and Industry, 
MIDWEST CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Oct. 23, 2020), https://investigatemidwest 
.org/2020/04/16/tracking-covid-19s-impact-on-meatpacking-workers-and-industry/ [hereinafter 
Tracking Covid-19’s Impact] (“As of Oct. 2, there have been at least 41,000 reported positive cases 
tied to meatpacking facilities in at least 455 plants in 40 states, and at least 196 reported worker 
deaths in at least 51 plants in 27 states.”). See also Michelle A. Waltenburg et al., Update: COVID-
19 Among Workers in Meat and Poultry Processing Facilities ― United States, April–May 2020, 
69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 887, 889 (2020) (reporting rates of COVID-19 
infection in April and May among meat processing workers at nearly 17,000 with 86 deaths). The 
numbers are more alarming when combined with other food processing and farm workers. See Leah 
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Amazon employees contracted COVID-19—a fact that justifiably received 
widespread media attention.10 Nonetheless, the meat processing industry had 
more than double the number of worker infections while having one-third of the 
total workforce.11 Yet, as of this writing, many plants have failed to fully adopt 
infection prevention and control (IPC) recommendations,12 and only two plants 
have been sanctioned (with de minimis fines) by the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) for failing to protect their workers from 
COVID-19.13 
The impact of these outbreaks is especially significant where state and local 
economies depend on the meat processing and agricultural industries. My home 
state of Nebraska is illustrative. Two-thirds of Nebraska’s meat processing 
workers are immigrants, and those without legal authority to work in the United 
States may make up the majority of workers in some Nebraska plants.14 
Nebraska has the highest number of cases tied to meat processing plants in the 
 
Douglas, Tracking COVID-19 Outbreaks in the Food System, FOOD & ENV’T REPORTING 
NETWORK (Oct. 27, 2020), https://thefern.org/2020/04/mapping-covid-19-in-meat-and-food-pro 
cessing-plants/ (“According to data collected by FERN, as of [Oct.] 7 at 12pm ET, at least 865 
meatpacking and food processing plants (506 meatpacking and 359 food processing) and 138 farms 
and production facilities have had confirmed cases of C[OVID]-19. At least 63,263 workers 
(44,633 meatpacking workers, 10,368 food processing workers, and 8259 farmworkers) have tested 
positive for C[OVID]-19 and at least 267 workers (213 meatpacking workers, 37 food processing 
workers, and 17 farmworkers) have died.”). For the total number of workers, see infra note 40. 
 10. Rachel Lerman, Amazon Says Nearly 20,000 Employees Have Caught the Coronavirus, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/10/01/amazon-
workers-covid-positive/. There is reason to question Amazon’s treatment of workers. See generally 
Complaint, Smalls v. Amazon, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-05492 (E.D.N.Y. Nov 12, 2020). 
 11. See infra note 40. 
 12. See, e.g., Waltenberg et al., supra note 9, at 890 (showing in Table 2 the percentage of 
employers that responded that adopted recommendations). 
 13. Press Release: U.S. Department of Labor Cites Smithfield Packaged Meats Corp. for 
Failing to Protect Employees from Coronavirus, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. 
(Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/region8/09102020 (fining Smithfield 
Packaging a penalty of $13,494 for failing to protect workers after nearly 1300 workers were 
infected and 4 died); Press Release: U.S. Department of Labor Cites JBS Foods Inc. for Failing to 
Protect Employees from Exposure to the Coronavirus, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. 
(Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/region8/09112020 (fining JBS $15,615 
for failing to protect workers) [hereinafter DOL Cites JBS Foods Inc.]. 
 14. See Associated Press, Nonprofit Estimates Two-Thirds of Nebraska Meatpackers Are 
Immigrants; Worker Shortage Looms in Industry, OMAHA WORLD HERALD (May 26, 2020), 
https://omaha.com/business/nonprofit-estimates-two-thirds-of-nebraska-meatpackers-are-immi 
grants-worker-shortage-looms-in-industry/article_29eb8b90-1dba-5384-950a-86abfac57119.html 
(“Immigrants make up nearly 40% of the industry’s roughly 470,000 workers, with higher 
concentrations in states such as South Dakota, where they are 58% of workers, and Nebraska, where 
they’re 66%, according to the nonprofit Migration Policy Institute. Estimates on illegal immigrants 
vary from 14% to the majority at some plants.”). 
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United States,15 with one in five cases at one point.16 In fact, out of a total of 
ninety-three counties in Nebraska, those with a large meat processing presence 
occupy eight out of the top twelve counties with the highest number of cases per 
100,000 residents.17 In late April 2020, three rural Nebraska counties with large 
meat packing plants averaged 77 cases per 10,000 people, compared to the 5 per 
10,000 people across the rest of Nebraska.18 One Tyson plant in Dakota City, 
Nebraska—a town with a population under 2000 people—had 786 cases and 3 
deaths,19 and cases in that county are spiking again as of this writing.20  
 
 15. Tracking Covid-19’s Impact, supra note 9 (stating the number, as of Oct. 2, as 5267, up 
from 4800 reported cases tied to meat packing in Nebraska on Sept. 25.). Of note, many residents 
of the Omaha area actually work in meat processing facilities in Iowa which have experienced 
outbreaks and therefore, the impact is likely higher than reflected in these numbers when 
accounting for employees that live in different states than the plants in which they work. Similarly, 
many people who work in a large plant in Dakota City, Nebraska, actually live in Iowa. For another 
example in which numbers can be difficult to track because workers are often tracked by the county 
of their residence rather than workplace, see Report: Utah Meatpacking Plant Had 441 Virus Cases, 
1 Death, LINCOLN J. STAR (Oct. 9, 2020), https://journalstar.com/news/national/govt-and-
politics/report-utah-meatpacking-plant-had-441-virus-cases-1-death/article_21b91c49-2992-5460 
-af69-555a29d0423a.html. 
 16. See Jessica Lussenhop, Tony Vargas in Nebraska: The Human Cost of Political Inaction 
on Covid, BBC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-54183191. 
 17. When sorted by the number of cases/100,000 residents, the top twelve counties at the time 
of writing are Dakota (Tyson Foods and across the river from Seaboard Triumph Foods in Souix 
City, IA), Colfax (Cargill), Saline (Smithfied), Dawson (Tyson), Thurston, Platte, Dodge (Lincoln 
Processing and Wholestone), Hall (JBS), Rock, Kearney, Douglas (across river from Tyson Plant), 
and Madison (Tyson). Nebraska Covid Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes 
.com/interactive/2020/us/nebraska-coronavirus-cases.html#countyupdated (last updated Jan. 16, 
2021, 12:27 AM) [hereinafter Nebraska Covid Map and Case Count]. See Tracking Covid-19’s 
Impact, supra note 9. 
 18. Henry J. Cordes, Three Meatpacking Counties Drive Nebraska’s Coronavirus Numbers, 
STAR HERALD (Aug. 20, 2020), https://starherald.com/three-meatpacking-counties-drive-nebras 
kas-coronavirus-numbers/article_e6a1f607-0ea7-5f3a-b788-dace185e6d66.html. See Coronavirus 
Cases Spike in Northeast Nebraska’s Dakota County, LIVE WELL NEB.: SIOUX CITY J. (Apr. 24, 
2020), https://omaha.com/livewellnebraska/health/coronavirus-cases-spike-in-northeast-nebras 
kas-dakota-county/article_31b7ed18-9de5-5144-a859-c40c27139a10.html. Of course, that number 
now seems de minimus by comparison as the Nebraska rates overall are in the hundreds to 
thousands per 100,000 in Nebraska. See Nebraska Covid Map and Case Count, supra note 17. 
 19. Douglas, supra note 9; Search of Dakota City, Nebraska, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/content/census/en/search-results.html?searchtype=web&stateGeo=none 
&q=dakota%20city%20city%20ne&disambFipsCode=3112000 (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) 
(showing a 2019 population estimate of 1,859 people for Dakota City). 
 20. Dakota County has a large Tyson plant and is also directly across the river from Seaboard 
Triumph Seafood in Sioux City, Iowa, which also has had outbreaks. Compare Tyson Fresh Meats 
in Dakota City, NE, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (search for “Tyson Fresh Meats 
Dakota County” and select the location at 1671 – 1671 Ibp Ave.), with Seaboard Triumph Seafood 
in Sioux City, IA, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (search for “Seaboard Triumph Seafood 
Sioux City” and select the location at 5555 Seaboard Triumph Pkwy.). On October 17, Dakota 
County had a daily case average of 484/100,000 over the last seven days and an overall infection 
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The meat processing plant outbreaks have contributed to economic harms to 
related industries;21 they have also disproportionately harmed individuals who 
have already endured centuries of structural discrimination.22 The disparate 
infection rates among those who identify as Hispanic or Latino/Latinx in 
Nebraska are significant.23 In late May 2020, individuals in these ethnic and 
racial groups accounted for 48% of COVID-19 cases,24 while making up only 
11.4% of Nebraska’s population.25  
And yet the plants have not universally adopted IPC recommendations.26 At 
one unnamed plant in Nebraska, thirty-one percent of tested workers were 
positive for COVID-19 (many of them asymptomatic), with a full third of 
positive employees reporting close contact with a visibly ill employee at work 
well after workplace protections should have excluded sick workers from the 
facility.27 In July 2020, attempts to address the industry’s incomplete adoption 
of IPC measures through state legislation failed to garner the necessary support 
 
rate of 12,269/100,000 residents, meaning roughly twelve percent of the population had tested 
positive for the infection. This overall infection rate was the highest in the State by far, with the 
second highest rate at 7,965/100,000 in Colfax, home to a Cargill plant. Nebraska as a whole had 
an overall infection rate of 2,932/100,000, with a daily case average of 338/100,000 over the last 
seven days. Nebraska Covid Map and Case Count, supra note 17. On October 4, 2020, Nebraska 
was number seven among all U.S. states in new cases per 100,000 residents with a daily case 
average of 197/100,00 over the last seven days, and showing Dakota County as having a daily case 
average of 399/100,000 over the last seven days. Id. 
 21. Kenneth Ferriera, Editorial, 10/4: COVID-19 Still Wreaking Havoc on Nebraska’s Farm 
Economy, LINCOLN J. STAR (Oct. 3, 2020), https://journalstar.com/opinion/editorial/editorial-10-
4-covid-19-still-wreaking-havoc-on-nebraskas-farm-economy/article_535733eb-84e3-5544-a238-
a25ef5a3b987.html (reporting that Nebraska agriculture could experience over $3 billion in losses 
after spring outbreaks caused meat-processing facilities to operate at fifty to seventy percent 
capacity, causing losses to beef, corn, and soybean producers). 
 22. Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Structural Discrimination in COVID-19 
Workplace Protections, HEALTH AFFS. (May 29, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/ 
hblog20200522.280105/full/ [hereinafter Structural Discrimination]. 
 23. NEB. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NEBRASKA COVID-19 CASE SUMMARY BY 
RACE AND ETHNICITY CATEGORIES 1 (2020). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Nebraska Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/NE 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2020). 
 26. Waltenburg et al., supra note 9, at 890 tbl.2 (showing none of the interventions were 
adopted universally across all the facilities that responded). 
 27. Matthew Donahue et al., Notes from the Field: Characteristics of Meat Processing Facility 
Workers with Confirmed SARS-CoV-2 Infection — Nebraska, April–May 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1020, 1020 (2020) (reporting that only forty-one percent of workers 
recalled having symptoms screened before entering the workplace). Other research with meat 
processing workers, including workers from Nebraska, indicates the industry only inconsistently 
adopted recommendations and that workers do not feel that their health matters to their supervisors. 
See Athena Ramos, Concerns and Perceptions of COVID-19 Among Meatpacking Plant Workers, 
UNIV. OF NEB. MED. CTR., https://tools.niehs.nih.gov/wetp/public/hasl_get_blob.cfm?ID=12211 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2021). 
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in the Nebraska unicameral.28 Further, between September 25 and October 2, 
2020, the number of cases in Nebraska tied to meat packing plants increased by 
almost ten percent,29 indicating a possible failure by plants to reasonably protect 
workers. Today, meat processing workers in Nebraska and other states are left 
with a terrible choice between their health and their livelihood.  
Even in non-pandemic times, most of the meat processing workforce is 
disenfranchised.30 Immigrants and refugees from numerous countries work in 
the plants and many lack legal authority to work in the United States.31 These 
workers face compound disadvantage by virtue of their race, ethnicity, limited 
English proficiency, and socioeconomic status.32 According to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), nearly ninety percent of meat processing 
workers who contracted COVID-19 in April and May of 2020 are members of 
racial or ethnic minority groups.33 In sum, these workers are already 
marginalized by structural discrimination34 and are further disempowered by 
spotty labor union involvement in the workplace, fears of immigration 
enforcement, and the coercive power of food and housing insecurity coupled 
with few alternatives to meat processing work.35 While the meat processing 
industry itself has been deemed essential, the people who work in the industry 
are too often treated as though they are invisible and expendable.36 
 
 28. Nebraska Lawmakers Reject Push for Meatpacking Restrictions, 10 11 NOW (July 29, 
2020, 3:02 PM), https://www.1011now.com/2020/07/29/nebraska-lawmakers-reject-push-for-
meatpacking-restrictions/; Unicameral AM3238, 106th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2020) (requiring 
COVID-19 related infection prevention and control measures, paid leave, and data collection and 
reporting by large meat processing plants). 
 29. There has also been a 9.7% increase in cases in nine days between September 25 and 
October 2, when the numbers went from 4800 cases tied to meat processing to 5267 cases. See 
Tracking Covid-19’s Impact, supra note 9. 
 30. Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Law, Structural Racism, and the COVID-19 
Pandemic, J.L. & BIOSCIENCES, Jan.–June 2020, at 1, 5 [hereinafter Structural Racism]. 
 31. Michael Haedicke, To Understand the Danger of COVID-19 Outbreaks in Meatpacking 
Plants, Look at the Industry’s History, THE CONVERSATION (May 6, 2020, 8:22 AM), https://the 
conversation.com/to-understand-the-danger-of-covid-19-outbreaks-in-meatpacking-plants-look-
at-the-industrys-history-137367. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Waltenberg et al., supra note 9, at 887 (reporting that among 9,919 cases in twenty-one 
states with reported race/ethnicity, eighty-seven percent occurred among racial and ethnic minority 
workers). 
 34. Structural Racism, supra note 30, at 7. See also Structural Discrimination, supra note 22 
(discussing the inequitable impact of COVID-19 on many essential workers and the lack of 
protections due to long-standing structural discrimination). See generally Waltenberg et al., supra 
note 9 (highlighting the inconsistent and limited nature of protections provided by employers). 
 35. HUM. RTS. WATCH, BLOOD, SWEAT AND FEAR: WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN U.S. MEAT AND 
POULTRY PLANTS, 1, 75, 77 (2004). 
 36. See, e.g., Athena K. Ramos et al., Invisible No More: The Impact of COVID-19 on 
Essential Food Production Workers, 25 J. AGROMEDICINE 378, 378–79 (2020) (highlighting how 
essential workers in the food industry often have little visibility or voice). 
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This Article expands upon previous ethics committee consultation on 
protecting workers in meat processing plants.37 Part II describes the nature of 
the meat processing industry, the workplace, and common characteristics of the 
people that work in the plants. Part III discusses the existing legal protections as 
well as the ethical foundations of worker protections during a public health 
crisis. Part IV describes a framework for worker protection grounded in those 
ethical principles with recommendations for government actors, industry 
leaders, and worker communities.  
II.  THE MEAT PROCESSING INDUSTRY, THE WORKERS, AND THE WORKPLACE 
Meat processing is a multi-billion-dollar industry.38 In the United States 
alone, there are approximately 3500 poultry, pork, and beef slaughtering and 
processing facilities.39 The industry employs close to half a million workers—
over sixty percent of them are involved in labor intensive production work of 
slaughtering, evisceration, cutting and deboning, packing and processing, and 
sanitizing.40 Over the last several decades, the industry has moved many of their 
 
 37. I am a member of the University of Nebraska Medical Center’s Global Center for Health 
Security Ethics Advisory Committee. Ethics Advisory Committee Members, GLOB. CTR. FOR 
HEALTH SEC., https://www.unmc.edu/healthsecurity/ethics/committee.html (last visited Oct. 30, 
2020). For the ethics report on this issue, see ABIGAIL E. LOWE, ET AL., GLOB. CTR. FOR HEALTH 
SEC., UNIV. OF NEB. MED. CTR., ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING MEAT PROCESSING 
PLANT OPERATIONS, WORKER SAFETY, AND COMMUNITY WELFARE (2020). 
 38. Michelle Perrett, JBS Sees Growth in Revenue and Profits, FOOD NAVIGATOR-USA (Apr. 
1, 2019, 11:52 AM), https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2019/04/01/JBS-sees-growth-in-
revenue-and-profits# (reporting tens of billions of dollars in net revenue for JBS, a Brazilian-based 
meat processing giant). Prior to 2020, there was little indication the industry was suffering 
financially, with billions in revenue and a positive forecast from the USDA. See, e.g., Meat Market 
Size in the U.S. 2002–2026, IBISWORLD, https://www.ibisworld.com/industry-statistics/market-
size/meat-markets-united-states/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2020) (describing about $7.4 billion in 
revenue and steady industry growth in 2019). For an overall picture of the agriculture and food 
industry’s $1.109 trillion contribution to the United States’ 2019 GDP, see Ag and Food Sectors 
and the Economy, ECON. RSCH. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-and-food-
statistics-charting-the-essentials/ag-and-food-sectors-and-the-economy/ (last updated Dec. 16, 
2020). 
 39. Explore Census Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/ (2018) 
(search “3116 animal slaughtering and processing”; select “All Sectors: County Business Patterns 
by Legal Form of Organization and Employment Size Class for U.S., States, and Selected 
Geographies: 2018”). 
 40. Those in the occupational code of production occupations (51-000) make up sixty-one 
percent of the total workforce of animal slaughtering and processing workers. See Occupational 
Employment Statistics, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/oes 
/current/naics4_311600.htm [hereinafter Employment Statistics]. For a description of the work 
done in each phase of processing, see, for example, MATT MCCONNELL, HUM. RTS. WATCH, 
“WHEN WE’RE DEAD AND BURIED, OUR BONES WILL KEEP HURTING”: WORKERS’ RIGHTS 
UNDER THREAT IN U.S. MEAT AND POULTRY PLANTS 17 (2019). 
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plants to rural areas, leaving behind the urban, unionized workforce.41 Similar 
to other sectors, the industry has consolidated into the hands of a few multi-
national corporations with ample resources.42  
A. Disempowered Workers, Structural Discrimination, and Health Injustice 
Meat processing workers were treated as fungible long before the 
pandemic.43 During the pandemic, workplace culture and practices 
compromised workers’ safety and created serious risks of COVID-19 
infection,44 as well as more severe illness for workers already disadvantaged by 
structural and institutional discrimination.45 The people who work in meat 
processing plants must work to eat and live and must assume infection risks in 
order to work.46 Those risks are heightened by pressure from federal, state, and 
industry powers to keep plants operating, even in the midst of outbreaks.47  
Adding to the multidirectional pressures on workers is the intersection of 
race and ethnicity with immigrant or refugee status of the workforce,48 with up 
to a quarter of the workers lacking legal authorization to work in the United 
States.49 This power imbalance that leaves workers with no options and fearful 
of being reported is no accident. Instead, the industry has increasingly relied on, 
and even recruited, immigrants who have less power to assert their rights to 
 
 41. E.g., Sapna Jain, Can We Keep Meatpacking Companies Accountable for Hiring 
Undocumented Immigrants?, 3 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 157, 159 
(2016). 
 42. E.g., Haedicke, supra note 31. See also MCCONNELL, supra note 40, at 22. 
 43. See, e.g., MCCONNELL, supra note 40, at 14 (discussing companies’ dismissal of long-
time workers in favor of cheaper, non-unionized immigrant workers). 
 44. See, e.g., Ramos, supra note 27, (describing workers’ statements that managers pressured 
them to circumvent COVID-19 screenings, come to work if sick, and return to work before the two-
week isolation period’s end). 
 45. “Institutional racism operates through ‘neutral’ organizational practices and policies that 
limit racial and ethnic minorities equal access to opportunity,” while structural discrimination 
operates through laws that are written or enforced to advantage the majority and disadvantage 
“racial and ethnic minorities in access to opportunity and resources.” Structural Racism, supra note 
30, at 5. 
 46. For a discussion of the ways in which blue collar and other essential workers are forced to 
work under risky conditions, see id. at 8–9. 
 47. See discussion infra Section II.C, Part III. 
 48. E.g., MCCONNELL, supra note 40, at 15. 
 49. See, e.g., id. at 19 (discussing an estimate that nearly one in four workers in the industry 
is undocumented); see also, Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and 
America’s Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1771 (1993) (“[Undocumented workers 
are] starkly unprotected and excluded on most fronts from the norms of aboveground employment 
relationships. Such employees often lack even the most rudimentary understanding of their legal 
rights, are vulnerable to exploitation, and are all but invisible to most of the citizenry.”). 
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workplace protections.50 Therefore, those who have little option but to work 
through serious and deadly health risks are those who already experience 
significant health inequities.51 The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated these 
existing health injustices, with a disproportionate number of infections and 
severe illnesses among immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities.52 
Additionally, meat processing workers are also more likely to experience 
health inequities based on income and locality.53 They are more likely to live in 
rural areas and to live at or near the federal poverty line,54 making personal food 
and housing insecurity more likely. According to one worker,  
[O]thers are fearful due to their immigration status and the majority are scared 
that they won’t be able to pay their bills or lose their job. There are people in the 
plant who do not know how to read or write, older people, and that makes it 
more difficult to apply for help because they don’t know how to write and much 
less speak English, but the common denominator is they are scared to be without 
a job and pay their bills so they go to work sick.55 
A lack of access to health care is also a reality—many are uninsured, 
underinsured, or may avoid health care settings for fear of immigration 
 
 50. Jien v. Perdue Farms, Inc., No. 1:19-CV-2521-SAG, 2020 WL 5544183, at *1–2 (D. Md. 
Sept. 16, 2020) (“Hourly wages for poultry processors are low, and the work is grueling and often 
dangerous. The poultry processing industry relies upon entry-level employees from vulnerable 
populations, including migrant workers, refugees, asylum-seekers, and prison laborers.”) (citation 
omitted). See, e.g., Jain, supra note 41, at 159–60 (discussing an influx of disadvantaged, non-
unionized immigrants towards the meatpacking and poultry industry). 
 51. See Samantha Artiga & Matthew Rae, The COVID-19 Outbreak and Food Production 
Workers: Who Is At Risk?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 3, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-
covid-19/issue-brief/the-covid-19-outbreak-and-food-production-workers-who-is-at-risk/ 
(describing the demographics and social characteristics of food processing workers and the risks of 
the pandemic). 
 52. See, e.g., David P. Bui et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities Among COVID-19 Cases in 
Workplace Outbreaks by Industry Sector–Utah, March 6-June 5, 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1133, 1133 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm69 
33e3.htm?s_cid=mm6933e3_w (“Although 24% of Utah’s workforce in all 15 affected sectors 
identified as Hispanic or Latino/Latinx (Hispanic) or a race other than non-Hispanic white 
(nonwhite), 73% . . . of workplace outbreak-associated COVID-19 cases were in persons who 
identified as Hispanic or nonwhite.”) (citation omitted); see also Anya Jabour, Immigrant Workers 
Have Borne the Brunt of Covid-19 Outbreaks at Meatpacking Plants, WASH. POST (May 22, 2020, 
6:11 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/05/22/immigrant-workers-have-born-
brunt-covid-19-outbreaks-meatpacking-plants/ (highlighting how meatpacking facilities, which are 
mostly staffed by immigrant workers, have become major centers of COVID-19 outbreaks). 
 53. Artiga & Rae, supra note 51. 
 54. See Jien, 2020 WL 5544183, at *10 (describing annual wages for a full-time poultry plant 
worker at less than $25,000). The federal poverty line for a family of four is $26,200; Poverty 
Guidelines, ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS., (Jan. 15, 2020), https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines. 
 55. Ramos, supra note 27. 
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enforcement.56 Workers often share transportation to and from the workplace, 
live in multi-generational or other congregate housing, and have frequent 
community contact with fellow workers.57 These factors make social distancing, 
quarantine, and isolation particularly difficult. Overall, structural discrimination 
and subrogation based on race, ethnicity, immigration status, geography, and 
socioeconomic status continues to harm the most marginalized among us, 
including meat processing workers, who have suffered inordinate harms during 
the pandemic.58 Without serious commitments to protecting these workers, the 
industry may continue to face outbreaks (and remain unprepared for future 
outbreaks) while workers continue to confront a deadly virus on top of existing 
health, economic, and racial injustices.  
B. The Dangers of the Meat Processing Workplace 
Even outside the context of COVID-19, meat processing work comes with 
numerous potential health harms—the work is physically demanding and 
dangerous, usually involving standing all day in cold, crowded plants and 
performing the same action over and over, such as deboning or cutting meat with 
knives or saws.59 Work-place injury rates are high, despite under-reporting,60 
 
 56. Id. See also, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT: KNOW YOUR RIGHTS, KNOW YOUR PATIENTS’ RIGHTS 1 (Apr. 17, 2017) (“The 
threat of increased federal immigration enforcement has raised concerns among immigrant 
families, some of whom may decide to forego necessary medical services out of fear that they could 
be putting themselves and their family members at risk.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Waltenburg, et al., supra note 9, at 887. 
 58. See, e.g., Neeta Kantamneni, The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Marginalized 
Populations in the United States: A Research Agenda, J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV., June 2020, at 
103439 (providing an overview of the ways in which workforce inequities intersect with inequities 
based on race, ethnicity, and wealth to create significant injustice during COVID-19). 
 59. See, e.g., Berry J. van Holland et al., Preventive Occupational Health Interventions in the 
Meat Processing Industry in Upper-Middle and High-Income Countries: A Systematic Review on 
Their Effectiveness, 88 INT’L ARCHIVES OCCUPATIONAL & ENV’T HEALTH 389, 390 (2015). 
(“[S]laughterers and meat packers have to stand the majority of their workday. They typically work 
on an assembly line performing one specific function, although they may rotate duties during and 
between workdays. Strenuous activities are performed, floors are often slippery, and workers are 
exposed to animal waste… work is performed near dangerous equipment, such as knives and saws. 
Slaughtering and deboning call for specific skills to be executed repeatedly, precisely and fast. Pork 
shoulder deboners execute almost 50 cuts and saws during one deboning operation. . . . If knives 
are not optimally sharp, higher force applications are necessary, leading to more operator exertion 
and increased risk for upper extremity [musculoskeletal disorders] . . . . [E]mployees may be 
exposed to airborne substances. For instance, one study showed a prevalence of 5.6% of 
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) in slaughterhouse workers when live pigs 
were involved. . .. There is also evidence of zoonotic influenza among poultry and swine workers.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 60. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Fagan & Michael J. Hodgson, Under-Recording of Work-Related 
Injuries and Illnesses: An OSHA Priority, 60 J. SAFETY RSCH. 79, 81 (2016) (“OSHA… found 
many workers from the debone line [in a poultry plant] who were seen for musculoskeletal 
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and include musculoskeletal, neurological, hearing, and traumatic injuries, as 
well as infectious diseases.61 According to a 2019 Human Rights Watch report, 
These workers have some of the highest rates of occupational injury and illness 
in the United States. They labor in environments full of potentially life-
threatening dangers. Moving machine parts can cause traumatic injuries by 
crushing, amputating, burning, and slicing. The tools of the trade—knives, 
hooks, scissors, and saws, among others—can cut, stab, and infect. The 
cumulative trauma of repeating the same, forceful motions, tens of thousands of 
times each day can cause severe and disabling injuries. Together, [meat] 
processing companies reported more severe injuries to [OSHA] than many 
industries that are popularly recognized as hazardous, such as sawmills, 
industrial building construction, and oil and gas well drilling.62 
In addition, the processing lines are allowed to run at high speeds (called 
line speeds) by virtue of several years of industry-friendly administrative 
actions, such as “line speed waivers.”63 Higher line speeds increase production 
 
symptoms and never referred to a physician. Their injuries were never recorded on the 
recordkeeping log. Worker interviews revealed that some workers stopped going to the nursing 
station because the treatments were not helping. Some continued to have symptoms that were left 
untreated. Others went to their own doctors but did not report the injury to their employer for fear 
of reprisal. Some workers transferred to jobs that allowed their symptoms to resolve.”); Jessica H. 
Leibler & Melissa J. Perry, Self-Reported Occupational Injuries Among Industrial Beef 
Slaughterhouse Workers in the Midwestern United States, 14 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENV’T HYGIENE 
23, 27 (2017) (finding self-reported rates of injury were nearly double those that were officially 
reported by the industry). 
 61. Leibler & Perry, supra note 60, at 23. See also van Holland et al., supra note 59, at 390; 
Thomas A. Arcury et al., “…You Earn Money by Suffering Pain:” Beliefs About Carpal Tunnel 
Syndrome Among Latino Poultry Processing Workers, 17 J. IMMIGRANT & MINORITY HEALTH 
791, 791 (2015) (conducting a qualitative study of poultry plant workers with repetitive motion 
nerve injuries); Remington L. Nevin et al., Association of Poultry Processing Industry Exposures 
with Reports of Occupational Finger Amputations, 59 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENV’T MED. e159, 
e160 (2017) (describing a high rate of finger amputations among poultry processing workers); 
Emilia Irzmańska & Tomasz Tokarski, A New Method of Ergonomic Testing of Gloves Protecting 
Against Cuts and Stabs During Knife Use, 61 APPLIED ERGONOMICS 102, 102 (2017) (evaluating 
gloves to increase safety during meat processing work because of the high rates of injury). 
 62. MCCONNELL, supra note 40, at 1–2. 
 63. The Food Safety Inspection Service began allowing poultry plants to increase line speeds 
over the 140 birds per minute for chicken, 9 C.F.R. § 381.69(a) (2020), and 55 birds per minute 
limit for turkey, 9 C.F.R. § 381.69(b) (2020), by granting individual requests to exceed the limits 
under existing regulatory authority. For an explanation of that process, see Petition to Permit 
Waivers of Maximum Line Speeds for Young Chicken Establishments Operating Under the New 
Poultry Inspection System; Criteria for Consideration of Waiver Requests for Young Chicken 
Establishments to Operate at Line Speeds of up to 175 Birds per Minute, 83 Fed. Reg. 189, 49048, 
49051 (Sept. 28, 2018). The poultry line speeds were set in 2014 after years of careful study. See 
Modernization of Poultry Slaughter Inspection: Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 162, 49566, 49566 (Aug. 
21, 2014) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 381, 500). The line speeds limits for pork were eliminated 
altogether in 2019. See Modernization of Swine Slaughter Inspection: Final Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 190, 
52300, 52300 (Oct. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 301, 309, 310) (“revoking maximum 
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(and profits), but come at the expense of worker safety as crowded workers rush 
to perform their assigned duties with cold hands and sometimes with sharp tools, 
often as line supervisors urge them to keep up the pace.64  
Workers describe workplaces in which their safety is secondary to 
production. According to one worker, “I do not consider the plant where I work 
safe. They only care about filling their production, and they do not care about 
the health of their workers or the risks of it.”65 Others have reported an industry 
practice of supervisors denying access to breaks or restrooms for long stretches 
of the day.66 Research by Ramos et al. revealed consistent narratives of 
dehumanization, with workers in every focus group describing “being treated 
like machines, animals, or something less than human.”67 Workers often report 
that dehumanization comes directly from supervisors in a punitive and 
hierarchical culture, with one participant saying, “It would be good if one were 
treated well, like a human being, like the human beings that we are . . . when one 
talks to the supervisors, they don’t even respond to you or answer you.”68 The 
workplace environment that privileged daily production goals and profits over 
worker safety even before the pandemic, combined with significant declines in 
regulatory scrutiny under the Trump administration, positions these workers for 
the additional harms of the COVID-19 pandemic.69  
 
line speeds and authorizing establishments to determine their own line speeds based on their ability 
to maintain process control for preventing fecal contamination and meeting microbial performance 
measures for carcasses during the slaughter operation”). 
 64. See, e.g., MCCONNELL, supra note 40, at 53 (quoting workers they interviewed as saying, 
“If it’s too fast and we’re hurting ourselves, doesn’t matter to them. They just want more and more 
and more”, “The issue is, when they’re running the line, they don’t even give us a minute 
sometimes. It doesn’t have to be like that—fast, fast, fast”, and “If you’re slow… the supervisors 
get annoyed. . . they come and intimidate [the workers]. . . . There isn’t anybody who can speak up 
to them—the supervisors are untouchable. No one listens to [the line workers]”). 
 65. Ramos, supra note 27. See also Athena K. Ramos, et al., “No Somos Máquinas” (We Are 
Not Machines): Worker Perspectives of Safety Culture in Meatpacking Plants in the Midwest, 64 
AM. J. INDUS. MED. 84, 84–96 (2021) [hereinafter We Are Not Machines] (quoting a meat 
processing worker on the non-enforcement of safety as saying, “[W]ell, when one starts working 
at the plant, well, they have rules the—safety rules and all of that. Those rules aren’t enforced 
because they want production and they don’t care about those accidents, well, those dangerous ones 
that can happen.”). 
 66. See, e.g., MCCONNELL, supra note 40, at 73 (“A few workers who spoke with Human 
Rights Watch described coworkers wearing diapers at their workstations or urinating on 
themselves.”). Line and floor supervisors are coveted jobs, with earnings that on average are nearly 
double what front-line cutters and packers make. See Employment Statistics, supra note 40 
(describing that supervisors have an average yearly income of over $58,000 compared with the 
$29,000 or less earned on average by the front-line workers). 
 67. We Are Not Machines, supra note 65, at 87. 
 68. Id. at 88. 
 69. MCCONNELL, supra note 40, at 4, 88–89. 
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C. SARS-CoV-2 Spread in Meat Processing Plants 
Meat processing plant conditions are ideal for the spread of SARS-CoV-19, 
which is transmitted from person to person by respiratory droplets and through 
the air.70 To contract the infection, individuals must be exposed to the virus at a 
high enough dose from an infected person, which depends on a number of 
factors.71 Density and proximity of workers, duration of exposure, ventilation 
patterns, air temperature, and whether or not the infected person is putting off 
more or less virus (e.g. talking or shouting rather than breathing normally) all 
impact the presence of and degree of exposure to SARS-CoV-2 and possible 
COVID-19 infection.72  
Inside the meat processing plants, cold temperatures reduce microbial 
growth on the meat;73 however, those lower temperatures may increase the risks 
of COVID-19 transmission and severity among workers.74 Ventilation systems 
that rely on recirculated air—which are common in meat processing plants—
also may facilitate the spread of SARS-CoV-2 via droplet and aerosolized 
 
 70. The science of aerosolized transmission is incomplete and rapidly evolving. See, e.g., 
Benjamin L. Augenbraun et al., Assessment and Mitigation of Aerosol Airborne SARS-Cov-2 
Transmission in Laboratory and Office Environments, 17 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENV’T HYGIENE 
447, 447 (2020) (reviewing current understandings of aerosolized transmission and creating models 
to demonstrate risk of infection in various physical workplace environments). See also Matthew 
Meselson, Droplets and Aerosols in the Transmission of SARS-CoV-2, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
2063, 2063 (2020). 
 71. Mahesh Jayaweera et al., Transmission of COVID-19 Virus by Droplets and Aerosols: A 
Critical Review on the Unresolved Dichotomy, 188 ENV’T RSCH., Sept. 2020, at 109819, 2 
(explaining how droplets, aerosols, and fomites carrying the virus can spread via talking, breathing, 
coughing, and/or sneezing). 
 72. For a recent and comprehensive review of COVID-19 transmission, see id. (reviewing the 
evolution of evidence, the modes of transmission, and the factors that influence risk). 
 73. See, e.g., Megan Molteni, Why Meatpacking Plants Have Become COVID-19 Hotspots, 
WIRED (May 7, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/why-meatpacking-plants-have-
become-covid-19-hot-spots/ (discussing the physical conditions common to meat processing 
facilities around the world that facilitate the spread of COVID-19); see also Recommended Physical 
Standards for Meat and Poultry Slaughter and Processing Plants, KAN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
https://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-source/meat-and-poultry/recommended-physical-standards 
-for-meat-and-poultry-slaughter-processing-plants-.pdf?sfvrsn=0 (last visited Jan. 11, 2021). 
 74. The exact relationship between lower temperature and rates of COVID-19 is still being 
explored but there is evidence of an association, see, e.g., Yueling Ma et al., Effects of Temperature 
Variation and Humidity on the Death of COVID-19 in Wuhan, China, SCI. TOTAL ENV’T, July 1, 
2020, at 1, 4 (finding a negative relationship between both lower temperature and lower humidity 
and death rates from COVID-19). See also Jinjun Ran et al., A Re-Analysis in Exploring the 
Association Between Temperature and COVID-19 Transmissibility: An Ecological Study with 154 
Chinese Cities, EUR. RESPIRATORY J., Aug. 27, 2020, at 1, 2 (suggesting a non-linear relationship 
between temperature and virus transmission). But see Tahira Jamil et al., No Evidence for 
Temperature-Dependence of the COVID-19 Epidemic, FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH, Aug. 26, 2020, 
at 2, 5 (suggesting the virus remains transmissible at higher temperatures). 
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transmission modes.75 Thousands of workers may be inside the plant at one time, 
engaged in physical labor that may cause heavier breathing.76 Additionally, the 
shifts are long and employees work in close proximity to one another on “floors” 
or lines.77 As one industry official explained, “[P]lants are typically designed to 
maximize space and efficiency . . . the meat industry is no different. Industry 
facilities are not designed for social distancing; that is an incontrovertible, if not 
inconvenient, fact.”78 Without aggressive measures to alter the environment 
inside the plants and provide personal protective equipment to workers, they 
remain at high risk. 
Several workplace policies also increase the risks around COVID-19. Many 
workers do not have paid sick leave.79 Even for those that do, punitive point 
systems, which are ubiquitous in the industry, punish workers for sickness or 
on-the-job injuries, and therefore incentivize working through illness.80 A work-
through-sickness culture and a failure to inform workers of protections based on 
existing laws is all too common.81 Organizational structures within plants are 
hierarchical, with line and floor supervisors using negative reinforcement such 
as point systems with the threat of termination to meet production quotas.82 Even 
in the midst of the pandemic, many large plants continued or instituted 
 
 75. Thomas Guenther et al., Investigation of a Superspreading Event Preceding the Largest 
Meat Processing Plant-Related SARS-Coronavirus 2 Outbreak in Germany, SSRN (July 23, 2020) 
(conducting a study that demonstrated meat processing temperature and ventilation systems with 
recirculating air that allowed for transmission of the same viral particles over an 8-meter, 26-foot 
radius). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., Waltenburg et al., supra note 9, at 887; Kim Krisberg, Essential Workers Facing 
Higher Risks During COVID-19 Outbreak: Meat Packers, Retail Workers Sickened, THE NATION’S 
HEALTH (Aug. 2020), https://www.thenationshealth.org/content/50/6/1.1. 
 78. Sarah Freishtat, Concerns Were Raised Multiple Times About COVID-19 and Smithfield 
Foods’ St. Charles Plant Before the Health Department Shut It Down, Records Show, AURORA 
BEACON NEWS (July 16, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/aurora-beacon-news/ct-
abn-smithfield-foods-covid-19-complaints-st-20200716-juh2l5rmgfeqdjuxgqdozqtczi-story.html 
(quoting a Smithfield plant official describing the difficulties of implementing IPC measures). 
 79. See, e.g., JOCELYN HERSTEIN ET AL., UNIV. OF NEB. MED. CTR., MEAT PROCESSING 
FACILITY COVID-19 PLAYBOOK 3 (2020). 
 80. See Fagan & Hodgson, supra note 60, at 81. 
 81. See, e.g., DINA BAKST ET AL., A BETTER BALANCE, MISLED & MISINFORMED: HOW 
SOME U.S. EMPLOYERS USE “NO FAULT” ATTENDANCE POLICIES TO TRAMPLE ON WORKERS’ 
RIGHTS (AND GET AWAY WITH IT) 1, 2 (2020); see also A Smithfield Worker, I Work at Smithfield 
Foods. I’m Suing Them over Putting Our Lives at Risk for Your Dinner, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 
2020, 8:15 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/04/24/smithfield-foods-lawsuit-
coronavirus/. Her case was dismissed by the district court on jurisdictional grounds, Rural Cmty. 
Workers All. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1233 (W.D. Mo. 2020) (granting a 
motion to dismiss to defendant Smithfield pursuant to primary jurisdiction doctrine). 
 82. BAKST ET AL., supra note 81, at 8–9. 
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attendance bonuses,83 further incentivizing working despite illness, inapposite 
to IPC recommendations.84  
Reducing the risks to workers and maintaining consistent production levels 
will require a fundamental culture change in the industry. For decades, the 
industry has prioritized production over safety.85 To weather COVID-19, 
industry and government stakeholders will need to abandon that false dichotomy 
and accept that protecting workers is the only ethically acceptable way to ensure 
long-term production and profits. Yet, the federal and organizational responses, 
to date, may prove insufficient to protect workers.  
III.  FAILURES OF EXISTING LEGAL PROTECTIONS AND AN APPEAL TO PUBLIC 
HEALTH ETHICS 
Public health activities are enabled by law and should be grounded in ethics. 
Law provides the authority for and outlines the limitations on governmental 
action, and may be used to require, prohibit, incentivize, or discourage behaviors 
to improve health.86 Legal enactments are slow and almost entirely reactive to 
existing unethical conditions. Even then, the function of law in relationship to 
ethics is typically to set minimum standards, while ethics goes further to 
interrogate which actions are morally acceptable. Nonetheless, law can serve as 
a useful “enforcer of socially agreed upon values,”87 and incentivize appropriate 
actions when appeals to ethics are insufficient alone.88 In doing so, law does not 
transform compliance into a new standard of ethical acceptability, rather it may 
prevent or penalize egregious wrongdoing and ameliorate harms. At the same 
time, law is sometimes wielded as an instrument of oppression and subrogation, 
or an enforcer of existing power structures.89 In the first six months of the 
pandemic, federal and some state actors selectively used legal powers in ways 
that rewarded the meat-processing industry and failed to protect workers. 
 
 83. See, e.g., Dyal et al., supra note 2, at 557; see also Structural Racism, supra note 31, at 
16–17 (describing a $500 attendance bonus for April, almost as much as a week of pay). 
 84. See, e.g., Ramos, supra note 27 (“I’m scared to go to work without knowing the exact 
number of cases there are. The $30 [daily] bonus was useful in getting sick people to return to work. 
That puts us all in more danger.” (emphasis added)). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See generally James R. Childress, et al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 170 (2002). 
 87. Charity Scott, Why Law Pervades Medicine: An Essay on Ethics in Health Care, 14 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 245, 257 (2000). 
 88. See id. at 258. 
 89. See, e.g., William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. 
L. REV. 1109, 1148–79 (1989) (describing in part the acts of the judiciary in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries to undercut the gains in the labor movements and reinforce the power of 
employers). 
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The Trump administration expressly favored less regulation of and more 
deference toward industry.90 This was also true in many of the states in which 
meat processing plants operate.91 In Nebraska, after plant outbreaks began, the 
governor stopped local health departments from announcing the numbers of 
cases tied to meat packing plants.92 He also worked to prevent any temporary 
plant shut downs,93 refused requests to implement state-level industry 
requirements to protect workers,94 and asserted that civil unrest would result if 
processing plants were temporarily shut down as an infection control measure.95 
At the same time, law can be an instrument of protection rather than oppression 
and there are a variety of laws that could protect workers if enforced.96  
A. Legal Protections 
At the federal level, OSHA is responsible for enforcing the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act (OSH Act),97 which was passed to “assure so far as 
 
 90. Keith B. Belton & John D. Graham, Deregulation Under Trump, REGUL., Summer 2020, 
at 14, 14, 18. 
 91. Nebraska, Arkansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Kansas, Georgia, Texas, and South Dakota are 
just a few states with meat processing outbreaks and who also have the least burdensome regulatory 
environment for businesses. See, e.g., WAYNE WINEGARDEN, PAC. RSCH. INST., THE 50-STATE 
SMALL BUSINESS REGULATION INDEX 5, 9, 11 (2015) (taking into consideration factors such as 
right to work status, workers compensation system, benefit requirements, and minimum wage 
requirements, among others). 
 92. See, e.g., Eric McKay, State No Longer Allowed to Track Processing Plant Data, NEWS 
CHANNEL NEB. (May 7, 2020, 10:31 AM), https://northeast.newschannelnebraska.com/story/4210 
2669/state-no-longer-allowed-to-track-processing-plant-data?fbclid=IwAR0IEKOS_NpE3gySZ 
ssH0tMkG-MMC8l-fjGTW4G9Y_mBELWHAthvB_8J2qQ (“Governor Pete Ricketts said 
Wednesday that the state won’t be releasing specific numbers of cases at meatpacking plants, 
saying it’s a matter of privacy.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Martha Stoddard et al., Ricketts Defends Meatpacking Plants, Says They Need to 
Stay Open Despite Coronavirus Cases, OMAHA WORLD HERALD (Apr. 23, 2020), https://omaha 
.com/state-and-regional/ricketts-defends-meatpacking-plants-says-they-need-to-stay-open-despite 
-coronavirus-cases/article_300eda3a-a3bd-5276-884f-c4e5fb90db5b.html. 
 94. See, e.g., Don Walton, Nebraska Meatpacking Worker Advocates Seek Workplace 
Protections, LINCOLN J. STAR (June 4, 2020), https://journalstar.com/business/local/nebraska-meat 
packing-worker-advocates-seek-workplace-protections/article_9d68739d-4e82-5f10-9a15-c663bf 
f884b8.html. 
 95. See, e.g., Ricketts Warns of ‘Civil Unrest’ If Meatpacking Plants Close, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.ketv.com/article/ricketts-warns-of-civil-unrest-if-meatpack 
ing-plants-close/32258716#. 
 96. Engagement with every federal worker protection law is outside the scope of this Article. 
For an interesting review of labor and employment law using a historical perspective, see Stephen 
F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical 
Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351 (2002). 
 97. For an overview of the history of federal laws leading up the passage of the OSH Act, see 
Judson MacLaury, The Job Safety Law of 1970: Its Passage Was Perilous, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/osha (last visited Mar. 24, 2021). 
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possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful 
working conditions.”98 The very language of the OSH Act includes appeals to 
reciprocity through mutual rights and obligations, including that “employers and 
employees have separate but dependent responsibilities and rights with respect 
to achieving safe and healthful working conditions.”99 
The OSH Act requires two kinds of duties from employers: a general duty 
and a special duty.100 Employers’ general duty is to provide employees with a 
workplace “free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause 
death or serious physical harm.”101 The general duty clause has been interpreted 
to require employers to act in a reasonably prudent manner in protecting workers 
from new or unforeseen hazards (i.e., those for which a specific standard does 
not yet exist).102 Those that violate the general duty clause face civil penalties.103 
The special duty requires employers to comply with specific standards 
promulgated by OSHA.104 Violations of a specific standard, rule, order, or 
regulation may result in civil penalties, and in the case of willful violations, 
criminal liability, including fines and imprisonment.105  
Most of the existing regulations promulgated by OSHA are targeted at 
reducing physical hazards in the workplace and exposure to toxic substances. 
There are no regulations that specifically apply to infectious disease 
transmission outside the healthcare work force. However, some regulations are 
relevant to COVID-19 transmission in the meat packing context. All employers 
have an affirmative duty to assess the workplace risks and hazards and to select, 
fit, and provide personal protective equipment (PPE) to reduce the risks to 
employees.106 In addition, the employer must properly train the employee on 
both the rationale for PPE and its proper use (with retraining whenever 
necessary), and enforce its use.107  
OSHA has considerable power to protect workers,108 although the power to 
protect non-health care workers from serious and deadly respiratory infections 
 
 98. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Public Law 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590, § 
2(b) (1970) (amended 2004). 
 99. Id. § 2(b)(2). 
 100. See David St. John, et al., Employment Law Violations, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 607, 609 
(2020). 
 101. Occupational Safety and Health Act § 5(a)(1) (This is commonly referred to as the general 
duty provision.). 
 102. See e.g., Fabi Constr. Co. v. Sec’y of Lab., 508 F.3d 1077, 1081 (2007). 
 103. Occupational Safety and Health Act § 17. 
 104. Id. § 5(a)(1), (6). 
 105. Id. § 17. See also David St. John, et al., supra note 100. 
 106. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(d) (2020). 
 107. Id. § 1910.132(f). 
 108. For a historical perspective on the OSH Act and the rights of employees to a safe work 
environment, see, for example, All About Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/archive/Publications/osha 
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is limited by existing statutes and regulations.109 In response to the COVID-19 
pandemic, OSHA could enforce the PPE provisions as well as the general duty 
clause to protect meat processing and other non-health care workers.110 OSHA 
could and should issue Emergency Temporary Standards (ETS).111 ETSs are a 
statutory mechanism for emergency rule making with immediate effect upon 
publication and are valid for six months, available when “employees are exposed 
to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or 
physically harmful or from new hazards, and that such emergency standard is 
necessary to protect employees from such danger.”112 Viewed as an 
extraordinary power applicable in limited situations, ETSs require both (1) grave 
danger and (2) a need to protect workers from that danger in the six-month time 
period for which the ETS is valid.113  
The COVID-19 pandemic presents the narrow circumstances that justify an 
ETS. Although some courts have debated the level of evidence and types of 
harms that amount to a grave danger, those cases concerned dangers with long-
term harms rather than the imminent illness and even death from COVID-19.114 
The most recent case to review OSHA action in issuing ETSs concluded that 
while grave danger is a policy determination, the harms an ETS hopes to 
alleviate must accrue “during the six-month period that is the life of the 
statute.”115 In the fifty years since the OSH Act became effective, OSHA has 
issued ETSs sparingly but had never been presented with a new, widespread, 
deadly, and easily transmittable virus.116 In fact, a deadly virus spread through 
 
2056.html#:~:text=OSHA%20uses%20three%20basic%20strategies,Partnerships%20and%20o 
ther%20cooperative%20programs (last visited Mar. 24, 2021). 
 109. During the H1N1 Pandemic, OSHA listed existing statutory and regulatory provisions that 
protect health care workers to which H1N1 protection could apply. See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
DIRECTIVE NO. CPL-02-02-075, OSHA INSTRUCTION, ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES FOR HIGH TO 
VERY HIGH OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE RISK TO 2009 H1N1 INFLUENZA (2009). However, for 
non-health care workers, there are no federal standards that apply to pathogen transmission and 
OSHA would need to issue an ETS or promulgate a new applicable standard to enforce special duty 
requirements. 
 110. Occupational Safety and Health Act § 5(a)(1). 
 111. Id. § 6(c)(1). For a comprehensive review of ETSs, see SCOTT D. SZYMENDERA, CONG. 
RSCH. SERV., R46288, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (OSHA): 
EMERGENCY TEMPORARY STANDARDS (ETS) AND COVID-19, at 19–20 (2020). 
 112. Occupational Safety and Health Act § 6(c)(1). 
 113. Mark A. Rothstein, Substantive and Procedural Obstacles to OSHA Rulemaking: 
Reproductive Hazards as an Example, 12 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 627, 670–77 (1985). 
 114. Id. at 670–73 (reviewing the elements for ETSs and cases that examined the criteria for 
grave danger). 
 115. Asbestos Info. Ass’n v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 727 F.2d 415, 422 (5th 
Cir. 1984). See also SZYMENDERA, supra note 111. 
 116. For a review of all ETSs issued by OSHA, see Rothstein, supra note 113; SZYMENDERA, 
supra note 111. The HIV epidemic did give rise to the agency’s bloodborne pathogens standard at 
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droplet and aerosol transmission in workplaces meets the requirements of ETSs 
perhaps more precisely than any other situation for which ETSs have been 
issued.  
Nevertheless, OSHA declined to issue an ETS, choosing instead only to 
issue voluntary recommendations together with the CDC for the protection of 
meat processing workers from COVID-19 (Joint Meat Processing Guidance).117 
Even then, the Trump administration and the Department of Labor went to great 
lengths to reassure the industry that “good faith attempts” at compliance were 
enough to avoid sanctions.118  
Not only did the administration issue separate enforcement guidance 
explicitly stating they would not strictly hold the industry to the voluntary 
recommendations,119 OSHA and the Solicitor of Labor issued an official press 
statement reinforcing that “good faith attempts” to comply are enough.120 The 
press statement included additional claims that appear to disregard the agency’s 
purpose of worker protections altogether. First, it asserted that state authorities 
could not order a plant to close or comply with additional protections.121 Second, 
the Department of Labor declared it would consider a request to participate in 
litigation and advocate for the employer in future lawsuits arising out of 
employees’ illnesses or deaths.122  
 
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (2020), but those would not strictly apply to respiratory transmission not 
including blood. 
 117. U.S. Department of Labor’s OSHA and CDC Issue Interim Guidance to Protect Workers 
in Meatpacking and Processing Industries, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. (Apr. 26, 
2020), https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/national/04262020. 
 118. See, e.g., Patrick J. Kapust & Scott Ketcham, Discretion in Enforcement When 
Considering an Employer’s Good Faith Efforts During the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-
19) Pandemic, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.osha 
.gov/memos/2020-04-16/discretion-enforcement-when-considering-employers-good-faith-efforts-
during; Patrick J. Kapust, Updated Interim Enforcement Response Plan for Coronavirus Disease 
2019 (COVID-19), OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. (May 19, 2020), https://www.osha 
.gov/memos/2020-05-19/updated-interim-enforcement-response-plan-coronavirus-disease-2019-
covid-19. 
 119. Kapust & Ketcham, supra note 118. 
 120. Statement of Enforcement Policy by Solicitor of Labor Kate O’Scannlain and Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for OSHA Loren Sweatt Regarding Meat and Poultry Processing 
Facilities, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/osha 
/osha20200428-1. 
 121. Id. (“No part of the Joint Meat Processing Guidance should be construed to indicate that 
state and local authorities may direct a meat and poultry processing facility to close, to remain 
closed, or to operate in accordance with procedures other than those provided for in this 
Guidance.”). 
 122. Id. (“In addition, courts often consider compliance with OSHA standards and guidance as 
evidence in an employer’s favor in litigation. Where a meat, pork, or poultry processing employer 
operating pursuant to the President’s invocation of the DPA has demonstrated good faith attempts 
to comply with the Joint Meat Processing Guidance and is sued for alleged workplace exposures, 
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Of the hundreds of meat processing plants that have had serious outbreaks, 
OSHA has sanctioned only two under the only mechanism available in the 
absence of COVID-19 specific ETSs, the general duty clause of the OSH Act.123 
A Smithfield plant in South Dakota was fined $13,494 for violating the general 
duty clause of the OSH Act after 1294 workers contracted coronavirus and four 
employees died—roughly $10 per infected employee (less than one hour of their 
pay).124 Smithfield is expected to contest even this minimal fine and OSHA’s 
findings.125 OSHA also fined a JBS plant in Colorado less than $16,000 for 
violating the general duty clause and a separate rule on turning over records.126 
Again, this nominal fine was a painless slap on the wrist considering that JBS is 
a multi-billion dollar corporation that reported an almost thirty-three percent 
increase in net profits in the second quarter of 2020, despite the pandemic.127 
Under the Trump administration, OSHA failed to align its actions with its 
statutory purpose of protecting workers, leaving meat processing and other non-
professional essential workers at ongoing risk of serious illness and even death 
from industry practices that prioritized profits over people.  
It is unsurprising that many meat processing workers are employed in plants 
that have implemented neither the Joint Meat Processing Guidance128 nor the 
 
the Department of Labor will consider a request to participate in that litigation in support of the 
employer’s compliance program.”). 
 123. The general duty clause was “enacted to cover serious hazards to which no specific 
standard applies.” Rothstein, supra note 113, at 645. See also Noam Scheiber, OSHA Criticized for 
Lax Regulation of Meatpacking in Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2020/10/22/business/economy/osha-coronavirus-meat.html. 
 124. See U.S. Department of Labor Cites Smithfield Packaged Meats Corp. for Failing to 
Protect Employees from Coronavirus, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. (Sept. 10, 
2020), https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/region8/09102020. The CDC described the initial 
outbreak at the plant, which they describe as Facility A, and concluded more rapid implementation 
of infection prevention and control measures may have reduced its impact. See Jonathan Steinberg 
et al., COVID-19 Outbreak Among Employees at a Meat Processing Facility — South Dakota, 69 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1015, 1018 (2020). 
 125. See Tom Polansek & P.J. Huffstutter, U.S. Cites Smithfield Foods for Failing to Protect 
Workers from Coronavirus, REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/health-
coronavirus-usa-smithfield/u-s-cites-smithfield-foods-for-failing-to-protect-workers-from-corona 
virus-idINL1N2G71IX; State Highlights, 43 WORKERS’ COMP. L. BULL. NL 6 (2020). Smithfield 
is a multi-billion-dollar company. Smithfield did post lower than expected earnings in the second 
quarter of 2020 because of the millions they have spent for PPE, new paid time off for employees, 
and other measures; however, they still enjoyed hundreds of millions in profits that quarter. See 
Ryan McCarthy, Smithfield Reports Q2 Operating Loss, MEATPOULTRY.COM (Aug. 12, 2020), 
https://www.meatpoultry.com/articles/23626-smithfield-reports-q2-operating-loss (noting that 
first quarter profits were 190% higher than 2019 but that “the company showed $102 million in 
second-quarter operating profit, but it was still well below the 2019 number of $221 million”). 
 126. DOL Cites JBS Foods Inc., supra note 13. 
 127. JBS, EARNINGS RELEASE SECOND QUARTER 2020, at 1 (2020). 
 128. See Cristin Nelson, The New Rules Have Not Made Meatpacking Work Safer, STONE PIER 
PRESS (July 12, 2020), https://stonepierpress.org/goodfoodnews/meatpackingworkersafety; see 
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recommendations from other public health authorities.129 Some of the plants that 
undertook most of the recommendations began rolling them back after a few 
months.130 This is concerning because every worker remains at risk—even those 
who contracted COVID-19 and generated an immune response may no longer 
have immunity.131  
Absent robust enforcement by OSHA and uniform industry commitments to 
safety, government and private actors have tried to effect change. Some states 
have taken action to establish their own requirements for meat processing 
plants.132 Under the OSH Act, states can choose to follow the federal standards 
and OSHA’s enforcement regime or create a state plan approved by OSHA with 
identical or stronger worker protections.133 Those states with existing OSHA 
approved plans were more quickly able to act to protect meat processing workers 
in the face of federal inaction. For example, Virginia issued an emergency rule 
specific to SARS-CoV-2 transmission as part of their state OSHA plan, which 
specifically applied to meat processing facilities.134 Other states, like California, 
had existing protections in their state plans specific to aerosolized pathogens like 
SARS-CoV-2.135 
Still other states used executive action. In Michigan, a July 2020 Executive 
Order included comprehensive worker protections, including a section with 
 
also Interim Guidance for Meat and Poultry Processing Workers and Employers, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 9, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov 
/community/organizations/meat-poultry-processing-workers-employers.html [hereinafter Interim 
Guidance]. 
 129. See Nelson, supra note 128. See generally HERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 79. 
 130. See, e.g., Kate Taylor, Tyson Reverts to Its Pre-Pandemic Absentee Policy. More Than 
7,100 Workers Have Tested Positive for COVID-19, Including Hundreds in Recent Weeks, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (June 8, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/tyson-ends-covid-19-policy-
as-more-workers-get-sick-2020-6 (reporting on Tyson rolling back policies that would have 
allowed sick workers to stay home just weeks after they were put in place). 
 131. About a third of people with a COVID infection develop little immunity. See David S. 
Stephens & Julianna McElrath, COVID-19 and the Path to Immunity, 324 JAMA 1279, 1279 
(2020). COVID-19 infection immunity may only last around ninety days. See, e.g., F. Javier 
Ibarrondo, et al., Rapid Decay of Anti–SARS-CoV-2 Antibodies in Persons with Mild Covid-19, 383 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1085, 1086 (2020) (conducting a study in which antibodies to SARS-Cov-2 
declined steadily over eighty-six days post-infection). 
 132. See Kyle Bagenstose et al., Coronavirus at Meatpacking Plants Worse Than First 
Thought, USA TODAY Investigation Finds, USA TODAY (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.usatoday 
.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2020/04/22/meat-packing-plants-covid-may-force-choice-
worker-health-food/2995232001/. 
 133. See State Plans, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov 
/stateplans/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2021). Of course, this leaves states that choose to follow the federal 
standards with fewer options if a new danger appears and OSHA doesn’t act to protect workers. 
 134. VA. DEP’T OF LAB. & INDUS., 16VAC25-220, EMERGENCY TEMPORARY STANDARD 
INFECTIONS DISEASE PREVENTION: SARS-COV-2 VIRUS THAT CAUSES COVID-19, at 12 (2020). 
 135. CAL. CODE REGS. 8 § 5199 (2018). 
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specific safety standards for meat processing plants in the state.136 However, a 
decision by the Michigan Supreme Court in early October effectively invalidated 
many of the governor’s executive orders related to COVID-19,137 and the 
Attorney General announced she would no longer enforce them.138 Nonetheless, 
on October 14, 2020, the state agency charged with workplace protections issued 
an emergency rule to protect workers with language quite similar to the July 
2020 Executive Order.139 Many states, however, have no existing protections 
specific to infectious diseases and meat processing workers, and have no plans 
to institute further protections.140  
Some have tried to force plant compliance through suits in equity; however, 
at least one federal court has dismissed a case seeking injunctive relief against a 
large meat processing corporation based on the primary jurisdiction doctrine. In 
Rural Community Workers Alliance v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., a meat processing 
worker and a workers’ advocacy group brought public nuisance and breach of 
duty claims against Smithfield Foods, alleging an unsafe workplace and seeking 
injunctive relief.141 The court dismissed the case, holding that the plaintiffs’ 
claims based on the company’s failure to fully adopt safety measures was a 
matter in the jurisdiction of OSHA rather than individual courts under the 
primary jurisdiction doctrine.142  
 
 136. OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR, EXEC. ORDER NO. 2020-145, SAFEGUARDS TO PROTECT 
MICHIGAN WORKERS FROM COVID-19 (2020) (using the State Emergency Management Act to 
create standards, including Section 14 specific to meat processing, the violations of which would 
be punishable as misdemeanors). 
 137. In re Certified Questions from U.S. Dist. Court, W. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., No. 161492, 
2020 WL 5877599, at *3 (Mich. Oct. 2, 2020) (holding that the Emergency Powers of the Governor 
Act is unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the executive branch and 
that orders under the Emergency Management Act after April 30, 2020, were void because of the 
governor’s non-compliance with requirements to continue a state of emergency under that Act). 
 138. See, e.g., Beth LeBlanc, After High Court Decision, Michigan AG Will Not Enforce 
COVID Orders, DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 4, 2020), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local 
/michigan/2020/10/04/after-high-court-decision-michigan-ag-not-enforce-covid-orders/36163800 
01/. 
 139. DEP’T OF LAB. & ECON. OPPORTUNITY, MICH. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH 
ADMIN., EMERGENCY RULES: CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) (2020). 
 140. See Bagenstose et al., supra note 132. 
 141. Rural Cmty. Workers All. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., No. 5:20-CV-06063-DGK, 2020 WL 
2145350, at *6–7 (W.D. Mo. May 5, 2020) (“seeking to force Smithfield to: provide masks; ensure 
social distancing; give employees an opportunity to wash their hands while on the line; provide 
tissues; change its leave policy to discourage individuals to show up to work when they have 
symptoms of the virus; give workers access to testing; develop a contact-tracing policy; and allow 
their expert to tour the Plant”). 
 142. Id. at *11 (noting that the primary jurisdiction doctrine should be applied sparingly but is 
justified when it is necessary “to obtain the benefit of an agency’s expertise and experience . . . in 
cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the 
exercise of administrative discretion” or “to promote uniformity and consistency within the 
particular field of regulation”). 
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The OSH Act includes a mechanism for imperiled employees to bring 
actions in equity when OSHA fails to protect workers in imminent danger from 
unsafe working conditions.143 Under 29 U.S.C. § 662(d), employees may seek 
emergency mandamus relief when OSHA has arbitrarily or capriciously failed 
to take action against employers when “conditions or practices . . . are such that 
a danger exists which could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious 
physical harm immediately or before the imminence of such danger can be 
eliminated through [typical] enforcement procedures.”144  
One such current case, Jane Does v. Scalia, involves a meat processing 
facility, with workers and a workers’ rights organization alleging that a meat 
processing plant in Pennsylvania failed to protect workers, months after 
guidance from the CDC and OSHA became available—choosing profits over 
worker safety.145 The complaint alleges myriad failures, including the plant 
violating its duty to protect workers from the dangers of COVID-19, in part by  
failing to provide cloth face coverings, configuring the production line in such a 
way that workers cannot social distance, failing to arrange for social distancing 
in other areas of the plant, failing to provide adequate handwashing 
opportunities, creating incentives for workers to attend work sick, failing to 
inform workers of potential exposures to COVID-19, and rotating-in workers 
from other facilities in a way that increases the risk of spreading the virus.146 
At the time of this writing, the matter is ongoing.147 
The Jane Does court is likely to treat the case as a petition for the court to 
review the reasonableness of OSHA’s decision, not to issue an ETS, as is typical 
for actions brought under 29 U.S.C. § 662(d).148 At least one other action 
concerning OSHA’s decisions not to issue COVID-19 related ETSs has already 
been denied by the D.C. District Court.149 That court concluded that OSHA’s 
 
 143. 29 U.S.C. § 662(a). 
 144. Id. Section 662(d) provides “If the Secretary arbitrarily or capriciously fails to seek relief 
under this section, any employee who may be injured by reason of such failure, or the representative 
of such employees, might bring an action against the Secretary in the United States district court 
for the district in which the imminent danger is alleged to exist or the employer has its principal 
office, or for the District of Columbia, for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary to seek such 
an order and for such further relief as may be appropriate.” Id. § 662(d). 
 145. Complaint and Emergency Petition for Agency Mandamus Relief at 1, 20, Jane Does I, II, 
III et al. v. Scalia et al., No. 3:20-CV-01260 (M.D. Pa. filed July 22, 2020). 
 146. Id. at 2–3. 
 147. The docket for case No. 3:20CV01260 is available at https://www.westlaw.com/Docu 
ment/I181F4A4ACC5D11EA8C24C7BE4F705CAD/View/FullText.html?transitionType=De 
fault&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1. 
 148. See, e.g., In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 830 F.2d 369, 370–71 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(denying petitioner’s request and determining that OSHA acted reasonably in the face of 
incomplete evidence in choosing not to issue an ETS). 
 149. In re Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Orgs., No. 20-1158, 2020 WL 3125324, at *1 
(D.C. Cir. June 11, 2020). 
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decision to forgo ETSs was reasonable “[i]n light of the unprecedented nature 
of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the regulatory tools that the OSHA has 
at its disposal to ensure that employers are maintaining hazard-free work 
environments.”150 
For workers who are not protected and fall ill or die from COVID-19, state 
workers’ compensation laws may or may not apply. In some states, harm from 
infectious diseases, such as COVID-19, are covered by the states’ workers’ 
compensation regime, as long as the disease arose out of employment.151 In other 
states, obtaining relief via the workers’ compensation system may be difficult or 
next to impossible. Besides proving the disease arose out of or in the course of 
employment, a claimant may also have to prove the illness did not result from 
causes outside of employment—a difficult matter to prove in the case of 
COVID-19.152 In some states, such as Nebraska, COVID-19 infections 
contracted at work that did not result from causes outside of work may still be 
outside the scope of workers’ compensation.153 For example, the worker may 
need to show that the infection was “due to causes and conditions which are 
characteristic of and peculiar to . . . [the] . . . employment and excludes all 
ordinary disease of life to which the general public is exposed.”154 When and if 
workers’ compensation will apply to workplace-related COVID-19, and whether 
workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy, varies by state and 
circumstance.155 
Infected workers and their families may need to turn to tort remedies instead 
or in addition to the workers’ compensation system. Already, wrongful death 
claims against employers are making their way through the system.156 However, 
tort remedies will be limited in many states, as many have passed limited liability 
and immunity provisions that could apply to meat processing facilities.157 Those 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. See, e.g., Beshears v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 954 F. Supp. 2d 500, 507 (N.D. Tex. 2013) 
(holding infectious diseases are covered by workers’ compensation laws, which are also the 
exclusive remedy for such illnesses). 
 152. See, e.g., Steadman v. Liberty Fabrics, Inc., 465, 468 S.E.2d 465 (Va. App. 2003). 
 153. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(3) (2018). 
 154. Id. (emphasis added). For a comprehensive review of workers’ compensation requirements 
by state, see generally Stephen A. Brunette, Causes of Action to Recover Workers’ Compensation 
Benefits for Occupational Diseases, 15 CAUSES ACTION 61 (originally published in 1988). 
 155. The complexities of when and if workers’ compensation regimes are outside the scope of 
this Article. For more information, see generally Brunette, supra note 135. For a recent dispute, 
see, for example, Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, John Devos v. Rhino Contracting, Inc., et al., 
No. 20-159, (U.S. petition for cert. denied Oct. 13, 2020). 
 156. See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey & Samantha Orwoll, Tort Immunity in the Pandemic, 96 IND. L.J. 
SUPP. 1, 11 (2020) (describing several such cases against employers). 
 157. For a general discussion of recent state action to limit liability of businesses from COVID-
19, see generally Thomas F. Morante & Yani R. Contreras, Liability Immunity Laws for Businesses 
May Impact Insurance Industry, ABA BUS. L. TODAY (June 23, 2020), https://www.americanbar 
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that offer the protections as a defense, upon a showing of compliance with public 
health guidelines, could actually incentivize the industry to comply with the 
Joint Meat Processing Guidance.  
At the federal level, some Republican lawmakers advanced bills with 
uniform liability protections, with the support of multiple state Governors, 
including Governor Ricketts of Nebraska.158 For example, the Pandemic 
Liability Protection Act grants immunity to health care providers and food 
providers (including food processing and packaging plants) for “any act or 
omission . . . [for] any harm arising from exposure to, or infection by, the virus 
that causes COVID–19.”159 The Employer and Employee COVID Protection 
Act exempts employers from liability in state or federal court for any injury that 
resulted from an employee contracting COVID-19.160 Senate Bill 3915, on the 
other hand, takes a more measured approach, but still grants immunity to 
employers for employee claims as long as the employer was operating in 
compliance with CDC guidelines, and federal and state operating 
requirements.161 While none of these bills became laws, it is unclear if similar 
legislation will pass in the current congressional session.  
Over a year into the pandemic, how and if legal and regulatory levers apply 
to protect and compensate workers is variable and uncertain. Inconsistent 
implementation and enforcement of legal protections present significant 
challenges for public health practitioners advising government, industry, and 
community stakeholders on ways to prevent COVID-19 infection and 
transmission in meat processing plants. This is especially challenging in an 
environment where politics and federal deregulatory actions prioritize 
industries’ economic interests over public health. Public health practitioners face 
complex ethical and pragmatic concerns at the intersection of worker safety, 
business operations, and public well-being. Navigating these concerns requires 
adherence to core public health values.  
 
.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2020/07/liability-immunity-laws/; Michael D. Shalhoub 
& Steven S. Vahidi, Viewpoint: Federal and State Civil Immunity from COVID-19 Lawsuits, 
CLAIMS J. (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2020/09/08/299170.htm. 
 158. See Letter from Eric Holcomb, et al., Governor, State of Indiana, to Senate and House 
Leaders (July 21, 2020), https://mcusercontent.com/3302177a320983d559c9bfb6a/files/7cb55ca8-
0df1-4bcb-a93b-250a970cb2cc/Joint_Governors_Letter_to_Congress_on_Liability_Protections 
_7.21.2020.pdf (advocating for federal civil liability protections for health care workers, 
businesses, and schools to “shield employers from legal risks”). 
 159. H.R. 7179, 116th Cong. § 2 (2020). 
 160. H.R. 6844, 116th Cong. §§ 1–2 (2020). 
 161. S. 3915, 116th Cong. § 4 (2020). 
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B. Public Health Ethics 
Public health ethics, unlike traditional medical ethics, is centered on 
populations rather than individuals.162 All plans to protect the public have a 
moral dimension and “presuppose certain ethical values, principles, norms, 
interests, and preferences.”163 During a pandemic, the need to center actions in 
an ethical framework is even greater than during other types of public health 
decision making. Amid the fear, uncertainty, and evolving science 
characteristics of a pandemic, history has revealed that a failure to explicitly 
engage ethics entails tangible consequences including loss of public trust, 
confusions about responsibilities, and stigmatization of vulnerable groups.164 
Though these lessons were explored after previous pandemics, they were not 
well heeded during COVID-19.165 As Thompson et al. have explained,  
The ethical framework is intended to inform decision-making, not replace it. It 
is intended to encourage reflection on important values, discussion and review 
of ethical concerns arising from a public health crisis. It is intended also as a 
means to improve accountability for decision-making and may require revision 
as feedback and circumstances require.166 
This Article offers some explicit ethical considerations in hopes they may be 
useful for ongoing planning and treatment of workers during the remainder of 
this pandemic and during future infectious disease outbreaks.167  
Public health is centered on communities and public health ethics are 
therefore understood as relational.168 Decisions about public health should 
recognize that people are social and interdependent and are “conditioned by 
opportunities and obstacles that shape their lives.”169 Several core relational 
principles ground decision making about protecting workers. Among the most 
salient are health and safety, health justice,170 and community values (including 
 
 162. See e.g., Lisa M. Lee, Public Health Ethics Theory: Review and Path to Convergence, 40 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 85–86 (2012). 
 163. Alison K. Thompson, et al., Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: An Ethical Framework to 
Guide Decision-Making. 7 BMC MED. ETHICS, no. 12, 2006, at 1, 2 (citing JARO F. KOTALIK, 
ADDRESSING ISSUES AND QUESTIONS RELATING TO PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLANNING: FINAL 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2003).) 
 164. Id. 
 165. See, e.g., Melissa McCullough, Ethical Decision Making in a Pandemic: Where Are the 
Voices of Vulnerable People?, 369 BMJ 2406, 2407 (2020). 
 166. Thompson et al., supra note 163. 
 167. In this brief Article, I cannot hope to do justice to these ethical values and the extensive 
scholarship on each of them from a multitude of interdisciplinary scholars. What I share here are 
simply boiled down explanations for practical use. 
 168. See, e.g., Nuala P. Kenny et al., Re-Visioning Public Health Ethics: A Relational 
Perspective, CAN. J. PUB. HEALTH, Jan./Feb. 2010 at 9, 10. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Health justice and equity represent here a collection of concepts described by leading 
scholars over time in public health ethics. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 162, at 95. (“Different terms in 
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respect for persons, solidarity, and reciprocity).171 These values should form a 
framework for action by the political and industry forces that influence non-
health care worker safety in the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Health and safety—necessary conditions for human flourishing—require 
measures that effectively promote health and well-being while preventing, 
minimizing, and mitigating health harms.172 This is a threshold matter and the 
primary goal of ethical public health action, or what Goldberg describes as the 
“absolute health” goal.173 However, the absolute health goal is unattainable 
without attention to the social, legal, historical, and cultural conditions that lead 
to health injustices.  
Reducing health inequities, or what Goldberg calls the “relative health” goal 
of ethical health policy,174 is tied to ethical principle of health justice.175 This 
has both distributive and procedural dimensions.176 In this case, health justice 
may be understood as using policy to provide populations with the sufficient and 
proportionate resources and opportunities (e.g., access to protective equipment, 
health care, and food security) in consideration of existing disadvantages 
through a process that builds trustworthiness in policy makers.177 Attending to 
justice requires policy makers to “recenter[] the narrative on the 
marginalized”178 to prevent the perpetuation or exacerbation of inequity.179 
Distributive health justice requires the reasonable, equitable, and proportionate 
distribution of resources and burdens.180 Procedural health justice requires that 
 
numerous frameworks specify similar concepts. For example, what Kass calls “social justice” is 
similar conceptually to what Childress call “distributing burdens and benefits,” Upshur calls 
“nondiscrimination,” Thompson et al. call “equity,” Baum et al. call “fairness,” Swain et al. and 
Jaffe et al. call “justice,” Petrini et al. call “equal opportunity for health resources,” the Nuffield 
Council of the note calls “equality between citizens,” and Kenny et al. call “relational solidarity.” 
The conceptual likeness of these terms represents the shared common values of respect for persons 
and protection of public health across the frameworks.”) 
 171. E.g., AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, PUBLIC HEALTH CODE OF ETHICS 5–10 (2019). 
 172. Id. All actions have to be evaluated for effectiveness in the first instance. 
 173. DANIEL S. GOLDBERG, PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF 
HEALTH 8 (2017). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See, e.g., id.; AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, supra note 171; Lee, supra note 162. 
 176. E.g., AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, supra note 171. 
 177. See, e.g., McCullough, supra note 165 (“The principle of accountability requires 
transparency about how and which decisions need to be made and on what basis, accepting 
responsibility for your actions, and being willing to be answerable to the outcomes of the choices, 
decisions, and actions made.”). 
 178. Craig M. Klugman, What Is a Bioethics of the Oppressed in the Age of COVID-19?, AM. 
J. BIOETHICS, 2020, at 29, 30. 
 179. See e.g., McCullough, supra note 165. 
 180. See generally James C. Thomas & Nabarun Dasgupta, Ethical Pandemic Control Through 
the Public Health Code of Ethics, 110 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1171, 1171 (2020); GOLDBERG, supra 
note 173, at 20, 22. 
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policy makers act in trustworthy ways (reliably, authentically, and consistently) 
to earn trust from those burdened with keeping essential industries operating 
during the pandemic.181  
Community values are also essential to ethical action in a pandemic. More 
than a collection of individual members, community is an ecosystem of 
interdependent relationships and interests.182 Respect for persons requires bi-
directional acknowledgement of individuals’ inherent worth (regardless of 
individual productivity, abilities, or social standing)183 and their membership in 
community. This is a kind of solidarity, not in the strict sense of assumptions 
about collective identity, but rather, “shared interests in survival, safety and 
security.”184 Reciprocity is a component of solidarity (and also the principle of 
justice in the sense of fairness) and calls for recognizing relationships of mutual 
exchange and acknowledging that those who accept disproportionate burdens 
are owed something in return. Reciprocity requires governments and industry to 
acknowledge burdens assumed by workers and offer protective interventions in 
return.185 
Measures to protect the public good (including the food supply and 
economy) during this pandemic continue to impose disproportionate burdens on 
workers in essential industries and their families. Decisions by the government 
and industry should be grounded in respect for these workers as people and 
community members and in light of the continued disadvantage of structural, 
institutional, and individual discrimination. Actions that promote the health of 
and minimize risks to these workers and their communities are not only ethically 
appropriate, but also prudent. Their continued labor (and ability to continue) is 
the engine that drives this multi-billion-dollar industry. These workers were 
owed better before the pandemic; however, the pandemic has quickly exposed 
the vulnerabilities of inequitable policies and the harms from decades of an 
industry treating workers as fungible. Workers have assumed additional risks 
during the pandemic and allowed the industry to remain profitable. In return, 
they are owed measures that protect their health and safety and advance their 
interests and those of their communities. 
 
 181. AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, supra note 171. For an approach from Ireland, see AN ROINN 
SLAINTE, DEP’T OF HEALTH, ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING IN A PANDEMIC 8 
(2020). 
 182. E.g., Leonard W. Ortmann et al., Public Health Ethics: Global Cases, Practice, and 
Context, in 3 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS: CASES SPANNING THE GLOBE 3, 24 (D. H. Barrett et al. eds., 
2016). 
 183. Bruce Jennings, Relational Ethics for Public Health: Interpreting Solidarity and Care, 27 
HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 4, 9, 10 (2019). 
 184. Kenny et al., supra note 168, at 10. 
 185. See generally CARL COLEMAN ET AL., WORLD HEALTH ORG., ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
IN DEVELOPING A PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 2, 14 (2007) (discussing 
reciprocal obligations of governments to health care workers during a pandemic). 
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IV.  A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING WORKERS 
The industry’s pre-pandemic adherence to its ethical and legal obligations 
to workers was weak at best. The pandemic exposed the disproportionate harms 
emanating from that weak foundation. The industry is ethically and legally 
obligated to provide reasonably safe physical working conditions, including 
modifications to mitigate infection risks based on the best available transmission 
science and public health guidance. Modifications to physical conditions are 
particularly critical because these workers are already vulnerable from years of 
unsafe workplaces and structural discrimination, leaving them with few options 
or advocates.186 An industry that has benefited from decades of disempowered 
workers has a heightened reciprocal duty and justice-based obligations to ensure 
protective measures in the workplace. This duty extends beyond the pandemic. 
Governments that continue to benefit from uninterrupted food supplies and from 
the labor of these workers owe them accessible information about the pandemic 
(including accounting for cases by plant and industry, race, ethnicity, and 
immigration status), enforcement of existing legal protections, and enactment of 
new policies that account for the increased risks of harms based on existing 
health inequities.  
The following recommendations are organized in three interconnected 
groups: (1) physical protections in the workplace; (2) institutional (plant and 
industry) organizational norms in the form of policies, practices, and rules;187 
and (3) structural (governmental) actions to protect workers.  
The success of physical protections and many industry policies depends on 
an ethical climate in the workplace and a culture of safety.188 This includes both 
messaging and action from facility leadership, including line supervisors,189 as 
well as safety concern reporting mechanisms and robust whistleblower 
protections. A path toward ensuring consistent adherence to pandemic 
workplace safety requirements is necessary to satisfy the underlying ethical 
values of reciprocity and equity. 
 
 186. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 35, at 1, 75. 
 187. See, e.g., Louise Manning, Moving from a Compliance‐Based to an Integrity‐Based 
Organizational Climate in the Food Supply Chain, 19 COMPREHENSIVE REVS. FOOD SCI. & FOOD 
SAFETY 995, 996 (2020) (“Organizational norms, the informal or formal rules that regulate and 
regularize compliance behavior are usually prescribed in policies, protocols, procedures, rules, or 
job descriptions and underpinned by a formal management system.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 188. See generally K. Praveen Parboteeah & Edward Andrew Kapp, Ethical Climates and 
Workplace Safety Behaviors: An Empirical Investigation, 80 J. BUS. ETHICS 515 (2008) (examining 
the relationships between company ethical climates and orientations, employee safety behaviors, 
and injuries). 
 189. See e.g., E.A. Kapp, The Influence of Supervisor Leadership Practices and Perceived 
Group Safety Climate on Employee Safety Performance, 50 SAFETY SCI. 1119, 1123 (2012) 
(finding positive relationships between line supervisor leadership practices, a culture of safety, and 
safety compliant practices by employees). 
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The industry has an opportunity to transform from embodying an egoist 
ethical climate (profit and efficiency over all else) to a principled ethical climate 
(morality, professional obligations, and laws matter),190 the latter of which is 
empirically associated with safety-enhancing behavior in the workplace.191 In 
other words, from short-term profit and production at the cost of human health 
to long-term profit while valuing workers as members of the community and as 
worthy of respect. During this transition and especially during the pandemic, it 
is necessary to uphold adherence to regulatory guidance and legal mandates as 
an imperfect measure of the minimally ethically required industry interventions 
to protect workers.  
A. Provide Safe Physical Conditions in the Plants 
1. Industry-wide Mandatory Administrative and Engineering Controls, 
Including PPE 
The Joint Meat Processing Guidance,192 as well as other public health 
authority guidance,193 includes engineering (e.g., physical barriers, ventilation 
standards, and enhancements) and administrative controls (e.g., physical 
distancing, active screening, and environmental disinfection) to reduce 
transmission within facilities. The Joint Meat Processing Guidance calls for 
appropriate PPE, which is also mandated by OSHA regulations.194 PPE 
shortages during the pandemic made absolute protection impossible in the 
absence of invocation of the Defense Production Act to increase supply,195 
necessitating a harm reduction approach (i.e., when absolute harm avoidance is 
impossible because of policy failures and the incentives to take risks, approaches 
that minimize harms are required).196 The CDC’s temporary guidance on 
optimal use of available PPE during times of scarcity was originally aimed at 
health care settings,197 but should apply to essential industries, such as meat 
processing facilities, to reduce harms to workers by providing the best possible 
level of protection under pandemic circumstances.  
 
 190. See Manning, supra note 187, at 1000 tbl.4; Parboteeah & Kapp, supra note 188. 
 191. See Parboteeah & Kapp, supra note 188, at 525–27. 
 192. Interim Guidance, supra note 128. 
 193. See generally HERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 79. 
 194. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(a), (h)(1) (2014). 
 195. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-701, COVID-19 FEDERAL EFFORTS 
COULD BE STRENGTHENED BY TIMELY AND CONCERTED ACTIONS (2020). 
 196. See, e.g., Daniel Weinstock, A Harm Reduction Approach to the Ethical Management of 
the COVID-19 Pandemic, 13 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 166, 167 (2020). 
 197. Healthcare Workers Optimizing PPE Supplies, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (July 16, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/ppe-strategy/in 
dex.html. 
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These actions to protect workers in the plant are ethically required, even if 
good faith compliance is enough in some areas to survive a legal challenge.198 
Workers continue to work at their own peril to keep the plants operating, which 
benefits the corporations and state and local economies, and keeps the food 
supply chain viable. Each of these stakeholders sits in relationship to one another 
and disruption in one part promises disruption in the others. Safe conditions also 
increase the probability of a continuing sufficient workforce by reducing 
absences related to viral exposure and quarantine or sickness. Beyond 
effectiveness in the short and long term, it is morally problematic to expect 
further sacrifice from workers who already experience compound disadvantage 
both during the pandemic and beyond. It is not reciprocal, just, or respectful. 
Attending to health justice, equity, and community values requires that industry 
comply in all respects with existing guidance to protect workers.  
2. Adjusted Line-Speeds and Workflows 
In non-pandemic times, meat-processing facilities measure success by 
production, which is influenced heavily by line speed and workflow.199 While 
line speed waivers were always controversial in terms of worker safety, the fact 
that the government continued to grant waivers in the midst of facility COVID-
19 outbreaks is indefensible and morally tenuous.200 In fact, in most cases the 
line speeds must decrease because of the reduced workforce from illness and the 
demands of physical distancing on the line. Facilities that refuse to reduce line 
speeds and adjust work-flow relative to available workers are putting their 
workers at risk of a deadly disease—this is not equitable burden sharing. 
Production levels must be reconciled with the urgent need to prevent and 
mitigate infection.  
The industry that profits from the labor of meat processing workers must 
shoulder the burden of line speed adjustments in exchange for workers taking on the 
risk of illness and death to maintain some level of production. 
B. Non-Physical Institutional Practices and Policies 
1. Consistent Application and Communication of Infection Prevention 
and Control Policies 
Putting IPC policies in place is meaningless if they are not widely 
disseminated and consistently applied and enforced (especially as against 
supervisors and others in positions of power over front line workers). Even in 
 
 198. See infra Part III. 
 199. See supra Part II.B. 
 200. Letter from Safe Food Coalition to Dr. Mindy M. Brashears, Undersecretary for Food 
Safety, Food Safety & Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Apr. 22, 2020) (on file with Safe 
Food Coalition). 
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facilities that have adopted appropriate safety measures, shadow policies aimed 
at productivity over safety continue—especially by frontline supervisors who 
have long been rewarded for increasing productivity at all costs. Some 
supervisors continue to enforce pre-pandemic policies, including disciplinary 
point systems or higher line speeds.201 These shadow policies seriously 
undermine the efficacy of pandemic-specific protections and create tangible 
risks for both worker health and longer-term facility operations. 
All levels of facility leadership—including line and floor supervisors—bear 
responsibility for implementing, enforcing, and appropriately disseminating 
information on COVID-19 policies, delivered in culturally and linguistically 
appropriate ways.  
2. Reward Safety 
Workers need paid time off and policies that reward safety and compliance 
rather than incentivize attendance. The general lack of paid time off means 
people will report to work when they should not. The addition of attendance 
bonuses, which was common during outbreaks, is short sighted and harm 
inducing. These practices, coupled with the point systems that punish workers 
for caring for themselves and others by staying home after exposure or during 
illness, must be eliminated.202 During the pandemic, these policies are 
unequivocally problematic. Without paid time off or personal financial reserves, 
workers are compelled to work through illness despite the direct threat to 
themselves and others simply to keep their jobs. The spread of preventable 
sickness and death among workers and in the community under these conditions 
is a forgone conclusion. 
Suspending punitive sick leave policies and attendance bonuses during the 
pandemic is a matter of justice and harm reduction; it acknowledges reciprocal 
responsibilities to workers who assume heightened risks and demonstrates a 
respect for workers and their families. It does cost the industry money, but in the 
end it serves long-term business interests. By maintaining a healthy workforce, 
facilities increase the likelihood of continuous production—a benefit to the 
facility and the workers.  
3. Provide Information and Advocacy Strategies to Workers 
Workers need information about COVID-19 and IPC strategies. Because of 
the multiple languages spoken in the plant and varying cultural norms, the form 
of delivery and person of the messenger will determine how well it is received. 
The information should be delivered in the appropriate language and context. 
 
 201. Michael Grabell, What Happens If Workers Cutting Up the Nation’s Meat Get Sick?, 
PROPUBLICA (Mar. 28, 2020, 1:25 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/what-happens-if-work 
ers-cutting-up-the-nations-meat-get-sick. 
 202. Id. 
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Recommended content is derived in part from federal guidance203 and should 
also include information on workers’ rights. Out of respect for the workers, 
communication and training programs should be easy to understand, provided at 
the appropriate literacy level, and in the preferred language(s) spoken or read by 
the workers. These empowerment activities must be meaningful and coupled 
with a commitment to safety and non-retaliation by the industry. Given the 
history of the industry’s lack of trustworthiness, engagement with community 
advocates and health workers is likely to prove far more effective. 
C. Government or Government-Industry Policy Implementation 
1. Provide No-Cost, Confidential Testing 
Because of the history of worker mistreatment, testing conducted by the 
industry is not likely to engender trust. Instead, local public health officials 
should facilitate access to no-cost, rapid, and accurate testing both for 
surveillance purposes and for symptomatic workers. This must be paired with 
paid time off for those who test positive and their close contacts to facilitate 
worker participation. Testing programs are prudent: asymptomatic and pre-
symptomatic COVID-19 positive workers will unknowingly pose a greater risk 
to co-workers and community members. Uninterrupted spread from these 
individuals can harm the well-being of the meat-processing facility, the local 
community, and potentially the nation’s food supply.  
For those with positive tests, contact tracing (i.e., identifying person-to-
person spread) should be done by state or local health departments (and not the 
employer), following CDC guidance.204 Confidentiality in the process is 
paramount—public health departments are ethically, and often legally, bound 
not to disclose contact tracing information to anyone, including employers. Even 
the perception that the industry is misusing the information or intruding into 
private spaces will increase avoidance, which will lessen the chances of early 
intervention.  
Confidentiality is a primary concern in public health, stemming from the 
values of professionalism, trust, and procedural justice, as well as from concerns 
for balancing individual privacy and community health.205 Breaches undermine 
 
 203. COVID-19 Control and Prevention, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., 
https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/covid-19/controlprevention.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2020). See also 
Interim Guidance, supra note 128. 
 204. Case Investigation and Contact Tracing: Part of a Multipronged Approach to Fight the 
COVID-19 Pandemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov 
/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/principles-contact-tracing.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2020). 
 205. Daniel Wartenberg & W. Douglas Thompson, Privacy Versus Public Health: The Impact 
of Current Confidentiality Rules, 100 J. PUB. HEALTH 407, 410 (2010). 
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trust, leading to understandable refusals to provide personal information that is 
essential to reducing outbreaks.206 
2. Ensure Adequate Housing and Quarantine or Isolation Spaces  
The industry should work with government and other private actors to 
acquire appropriate housing options for workers who cannot adequately 
quarantine or isolate in their typical housing.207 This is critical for reducing risks 
to workers and their communities and should be free to the workers. A 
commitment to reciprocity underlies the industry’s responsibility here—both 
because the industry bears some responsibility for its workers’ financial 
insecurity that contributes to crowded housing and because the workers continue 
to assume substantial risk of infection in the workplace during the pandemic. 
3. Partner with Public Health Departments and Community 
Organizations 
Community organizations and advocates understand how to best mobilize 
information where workers and their families live. These groups and individuals 
have pre-existing credibility with the community and are viewed as trustworthy 
sources of information and resources. The effectiveness of community 
advocates in bolstering the IPC measures and promoting worker and community 
health is well demonstrated.208 These resources are also essential for addressing 
vaccine-related questions and concerns.209  
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4. Provide Transportation Alternatives 
Meat processing workers often carpool to and from work, presenting another 
opportunity for virus transmission.210 Facilities should provide safer alternative 
transportation options (such as small numbers, required masks, and enhanced 
ventilation in the vehicle where possible). While only a minority of facilities 
have done so, it is justified by prudential and ethical factors during the 
pandemic.211 
5. Provide Healthcare Coverage for Those Who Develop COVID-19 
Health care access is a basic human right; even as the national debate about 
how to provide basic access to health care continues, access to care for those 
with COVID-19 is a pressing need to reduce unnecessary illness and death. The 
responsibility for providing coverage for workers should be shared among the 
meat processing industry, the government, and other stakeholders who most 
benefit from continued meat processing operations. Caring for workers and their 
families that fall ill after risking their health and lives to maintain production is 
a matter of equity, reciprocity, and respect for these essential workers. 
Government solutions to improve basic health care access for all, regardless of 
immigration or socioeconomic status, is critical to the nation’s health overall and 
to creating an equitable baseline to reduce the disproportionate morbidity and 
mortality in this and future pandemics and epidemics.  
6. Legal Mandates for Worker Safety 
Every level of government should prioritize worker safety during the 
pandemic and address the structural drivers of disparate risks to workers. 
Innovative policy development is needed at the federal, state, and local levels. 
Of course, OSHA should exercise its authority to issue ETSs and robustly 
enforce the OSH Act, and the federal government should enhance PPE 
production. These are necessary but not sufficient actions to ameliorate the 
dangers and harms to workers in essential industries. Multilevel, innovative 
policy responses are needed.212 State and local governments can supplement 
federal efforts and also create solutions that benefit from existing relationships 
and an understanding of regional needs.213 However, caution is needed to avoid 
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harm-inducing policies, For example, state and local policy may fail to protect 
workers because of the tyranny of local majorities, which can reinforce 
subrogation of the less powerful, or because of a susceptibility to economic 
competition.214  
Legally required and enforced worker protections are needed as well as 
revisions to workers’ compensation laws to cover workplace acquired COVID-
19 related illnesses and death. Other legal enactments, such as minimum wage 
increases and requiring employers to provide paid time off, could help better 
position workers to avoid workplace injury and illness in the future. Deference 
to the industry at the expense of workers is both unethical and short sighted. A 
principled culture of compliance in the workplace, enhanced by robust 
enforcement of worker safety laws, is a first step toward treating meat processing 
workers as essential. Comprehensive policy changes based in equity to ensure 
living wages, sick time, and health care access are ultimately needed to prevent 
the ravages of the next pandemic on communities of color. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted and exacerbated existing health 
injustices. People who are Latino/Latinx, Black, Indigenous, or members of 
other minority groups have disproportionately paid with their very lives. The 
pandemic has also exposed the complex interdependence of worker health and 
well-being, community health, and economic security. Industries like meat 
processing facilities—with congregate and high-density workplaces staffed by 
workers who are already disadvantaged by structural discrimination—must 
reckon with decades of subrogation and exploitation of workers. During this 
pandemic, the industry has pushed that exploitation to a point of no return. 
Policies to protect workers need a reset to an orientation of solidarity, mutual 
respect, justice, and equity.215 It is time for the industry that has so often profited 
at the expense of worker safety to sacrifice their fair share. The ethical 
underpinnings here are applicable to other workers’ who have been relegated to 
the sidelines in other essential industries, such as agriculture, retail and public 
service, and long-term care. Many groups of non-professional essential workers 
(e.g., meat processing workers, certified nursing assistants, and agricultural 
workers) were already positioned for health harms before the pandemic due to 
workplace conditions, poor access to care, and poor health outcomes. Making 
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ethical decisions about workplace protections during a pandemic should account 
for those heightened risks and existing disadvantages.  
VI.  AFTERWARD 
As this Article goes to press, plant outbreaks continue,216 and a report from 
the National Academies estimates that up to eight percent of all COVID-19 cases 
in the United States are linked to meat processing plants.217 Evidence continues 
to emerge around the pressures on essential workers and the heightened risks for 
those who are immigrants or members of racial or ethnic minority groups. A 
new qualitative study of Latino/Latinx individuals hospitalized from COVID-19 
identified many of the themes discussed in this Article, including continuing to 
work despite health risks and with COVID-19 symptoms because of a lack of 
paid time off or sick days as well as financial, food, and housing insecurity.218 
Participants also were reluctant to seek medical care because of health care costs, 
lack of insurance, and fears of immigration enforcement and deportation.219 And 
more actions against meat processing companies are working their way through 
the courts.220 
There are also hopeful signs that the orientation of the federal government 
has shifted toward prioritizing access to health care,221 a commitment to 
equity,222 and worker protection under the Biden administration.223 An 
executive order issued January 21, 2021, began by describing the health and 
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safety of workers as a “national priority and moral imperative.”224 The order 
directed OSHA to consider ETSs, review enforcement efforts, and launch a 
national program to focus on enforcement.225 On February 1, 2021, the House 
Select Committee on the Coronavirus Crisis initiated an investigation of the 
meat processing industry’s handling of the worker protections during the 
pandemic.226 The Biden administration halted line speed waivers and the Office 
of the Inspector General in the Department of Labor issued a report critical of 
OSHA’s handling of safety concerns and lack of inspections in the last year 
despite a fifty percent increase in reports of worker safety concerns.227 On March 
12, 2021, OSHA created a new National Emphasis Program that will focus 
inspections and investigations on establishments with increased COVID-19 
risks, where complaints and referrals are high.228 Although an ETS has not yet 
been issued, this administration appears committed to worker safety. In the end, 
the existing structural inequities and worker exploitation made the industry less 
agile during the pandemic. Long term commitments to workers’ rights with the 
burden on industry to adopt those commitments is the only way to ethically and 
practically prepare for the next pandemic or public health crisis.  
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